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ABSTRACT

Traditionalsumptuary laws, especially those government efforts
aimed at regulating public attire, are often considered to be largely
dusty relics of pre-industrialsocieties. Yet cultural legal theorists have
long argued that sumptuary codes are still relevant and inextricably
linked to the development of our contemporary sociolegal hierarchy. A
better understanding of the primary objectives embodied in earlier
sumptuary codes can shed important historical light and guidance on
issues being discussed in current policy-making arenas, such as the
proposed Design Piracy ProhibitionAct (DPPA). The proposed law has
yielded lively debates amongst legal commentators and industry
professionals regarding whether or not fashion designs should be
protected under copyright law. Although strong arguments exist on
both sides of the issue, what is typically missing from the discussion is
an adequate consideration of historical context concerning earlier
government efforts to regulate dress.
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Examining the congressional testimony and stated objectives of
the DPPA, one can tease out some of the core principles of preindustrial sumptuary codes; government control over social identity,
the reinforcement of public morality, and the implementation of
economic protectionism. Part I of this article provides a brief overview
of pre-industrial sumptuary laws and addresses the main stated
objectives and evolution of these restrictive codes. Part II illustrates
linkages between the primary foundational tenets of traditional
sumptuary laws and the proposed objectives of the DPPA. Part III
cautions that earlier sumptuary laws often suffered from infrequent
and half-hearted enforcement, increased demand for and piracy of the
forbidden items, and insufficient public support for and compliance
with the proposed laws. The article concludes that absent a better
understandingand recognition of the threads of our sumptuary past in
our current legal order, the proposed Act may likely endure a similar
fate, if enacted.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

III.
IV .

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SUMPTUARY LAWS .............. 52
A. Discourses on Social Order and the Visual Hierarchy
in Pre-IndustrialTimes .............................................. 52
B. English Sumptuary Codes and the Evolving Role of
Economic Protectionism.............................................. 58
C. Sinfulness, Social Station, and Income in Colonial
A m erica ...................................................................... 62
D. Social Norms and ChangingFashionDiffusion Models . 65
ECHOES OF THE SUMPTUARY IMPULSE IN THE DPPA .............. 72
A. Overview of ProposedDPPA........................................ 72
B. New Efforts to Police Social Boundaries..................... 76
C. Addressing Societal Anxieties in UncertainEconomic
T im es .........................................................................
. . 80
D. Public Morality and the Language of Theft ................. 85
KEY LESSONS FROM PAST SUMPTUARY PROJECTS ................... 88
CONCLUSION ........................................................................... 91

Amusing news stories occasionally appear on television and on
the Internet about government efforts to control modern dress,1 such

1.
See DIANA CRANE, FASHION AND ITS SOCIAL AGENDAS, CLASS, GENDER, AND IDENTITY
CLOTHING 131 n.27 (2000) (discussing 1986 South Carolina law requiring female legislative staff
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as laws demanding that citizens pull up their low-riding pants2 or
prohibiting beachgoers from wearing skimpy swimwear. 3 The general
public often scoffs at these regulations as examples of silly legislative
conduct or outdated parochial moralizing. 4 In the United States, the
notion of modern government prescribing exacting standards of
5
individual dress provokes not only public resentment and ridicule,
6
but also legal action aimed at stopping this governmental intrusion.
to wear skirts, not pants); William Cooper Jr., Saggy Pants Law Overwhelmingly Approved in
Riviera Beach, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.palmbeachpost.com/politics/
contentllocal-newsepaper2008/03/1 1/03llrivcharter.html; Michael Peltier, State Passes Droopy
Pants Law, REUTERS, Mar. 2, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/oddlyEnoughNews/
idUSN1333370820080314; Blushing Va. Pols Drop Droopy-Pants Fine, FOxNEWS.COM, Feb. 10,
2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/O,2933,147057,00.html. Professor Alan Hunt, whose book is
considered a seminal work on the subject of sumptuary laws, stated that "[tlhe project of
[T]he imposition of
regulating dress was the classic embodiment of sumptuary regulation ....
restrictions on clothing would strike . . . twentieth century citizens as objectionable in principle
and faintly ridiculous." ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF
SUMPTUARY LAW 382 (1996).

Echoing Professor Hunt's assertion, President Barack Obama, while a U.S. Senator
2.
campaigning for the presidency in 2008, noted, "I think people passing a law against people
[Any public official, that is worrying about
wearing sagging pants is a waste of time ....
sagging pants probably needs to spend some time focusing on real problems out there." Interview
by Sway Calloway, Reporter for MTV News, with Barack Obama, U.S. Senator and U.S.
Presidential Candidate, in Nevada (Nov. 1, 2008), available at http://www.mtv.comlnews/articles/
1598409/20081102/story.jhtml. However, the enduring social attitude about appropriate dress
lingered as he added, "Having said that, brothers should pull up their pants." Id.
3.
See Donna Leinwand, Alcohol-Soaked Spring Break Lures Students Abroad, USA
TODAY, Jan. 5, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-01-05-spring-break-usat-x.htm;
Colin Randall, ParisBeach Ban Rules Thongs to be Beyond the Pale, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), July 31,
2006, http://www.telegraph.co.uklnews/1525264/ Paris-beach-ban-rules-thongs-to-be-beyond-thepale.html.
4.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 382; Peter Goodrich, Signs Taken for Wonders: Community,
Identity, and A History of Sumptuary Law, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 707, 708 (1998) (book review);
see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
5.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 382; Goodrich, supranote 4, at 708.
6.
Jon Bowen, Thong Wars, SALON, Mar. 8, 1999, http://www.salon.com/it/acad/1999/
03/08acad.html (Ohio college professor sues college over ban on thongs at school pool facilities.);
Eliot Kleinberg, Judge: Riviera Beach 'Saggy Pants' Ban Unconstitutional,PALM BEACH POST,
Sept. 15, 2008, http://www.palmbeachpost.comlocalnews/ content/localnews/epaper/2008/09/15/
0912saggy.html; Attorney's 'FashionStatement' Not Protected, 78 U.S.L.W. 1258, citing Bank v.
Katz, E.D.N.Y., No. 08-cv-1033, 9/24/09) (court determined that lawyer appearing pro se in state
court wearing "Operation Desert Storm" baseball cap and blue jeans has no constitutional right
to do so and was viewpoint-neutral restriction that protects dignity of courtrooms as nonpublic
forums). Workplace dress codes have largely replaced governmental attempts under sumptuary
codes to proscribe appropriate dress for the general adult population. CRANE, supra note 1, at 87,
94-95; HUNT, supra note 1, at 382-84; Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing:Regulation of Employee
Appearance, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1395, 1431-32 (1992); see I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing
and the Criminal,20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 10 (2008) (contending that sumptuary laws persist
but are "dispersed throughout a range of both public and private forms of governance."); see infra
notes 129-74 and accompanying text.
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Yet, for centuries, sumptuary laws prescribing detailed regulations
about who could wear certain attire and when they could wear it were
7
a fact of life in societies around the globe.
Modern legal commentaries typically dismiss traditional
sumptuary laws on dress as dusty historical relics of pre-industrial
societies.8 However, to assume that sumptuary dress codes are a
thing of the past underestimates the robustness of this enduring legal
construct. In fact, many cultural legal theorists argue that sumptuary
laws concerning dress are still relevant and are inextricably linked to
the development of our contemporary socio-legal hierarchy. 9 Noted
cultural legal theorist Alan Hunt contends that "sumptuary laws did
not so much 'die' as undergo a process of transfiguration or
metamorphosis such that the original is barely recognizable in the
resultant, just as the butterfly can barely be imagined from the
chrysalis." 10 As Hunt indicated with his metaphorical butterfly, a host
of modern laws are built upon the foundation of earlier sumptuary
laws, with objectives easily traced back to long-established sumptuary

7.
Traditionally, sumptuary laws were detailed government regulations regulating how
individuals could spend their financial resources, particularly with respect to boastful public
displays of fine clothing and/or excessive consumption of food or drink. 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW
DICTIONARY, ADAPTED TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND
OF THE SEVERAL STATES OF THE UNION 684 (15th ed. Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1883).
Today sumptuary laws are broadly defined to include activities viewed as immoral expenditures,
such as gambling or prostitution. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1204 (8th ed. 2005) (defining
sumptuary laws). For excellent books discussing sumptuary codes and the historical role of
fashion in developing social hierarchy, see generally KATHLEEN M. BROWN, GOOD WIVES, NASTY
WENCHES, AND ANXIOUS PATRIARCHS: GENDER, RACE, AND POWER IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA (1996);
CRANE, supra note 1; RICHARD P. GILDRIE, THE PROFANE, THE CIVIL, AND THE GODLY: THE
REFORMATION OF MANNERS IN ORTHODOX ENGLAND, 1679-1749 (1994); PETER CHARLES HOFFER,
LAW AND PEOPLE IN COLONIAL AMERICA (rev. ed. 1998); HUNT, supra note 1.
8.
HUNT, supra note 1, at xviii, 361; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 707-08; See infra note 9
and accompanying text.
9.
HUNT, supra note 1, at xviii, 361; Anne Theodore Briggs, Hung Out to Dry: Clothing
Design ProtectionPitfalls in United States Law, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 204 (2002);
Goodrich, supra note 4, at 708. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. In his review essay,
Prof. Goodrich noted:
The study of sumptuary law should not, as hitherto, be dismissed as an insignificant
and archaic governance of the superfluous. Nor was it a purely premodern legal
phenomenon. Far from being a failure, sumptuary law was an intrinsic element in the
formation of the modern legal order. Legislation regulating dress and the other forms
of "presentation of the self' were crucial aspects of the formation of the social order
and most specifically played a vital role in the identity and identification of the
"imagined communities" and moods of nation, class and gender.
Goodrich, supra note 4, at 708 (citation omitted); see infra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
10.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 361; See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
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pronouncements. 1
An examination of the main assumptions
underlying the sumptuary codes of the past will shed important
historical light and provide guidance on issues that are still discussed
in policy-making arenas today.
A recent example of the resilience of sumptuary law is the 2009
re-introduction of the proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act (DPPA),
which is aimed at preventing retailers and manufacturers from selling
or producing clothing that intentionally copies registered fashion
designs.1 2 This legislation has spurred a lively debate among legal
scholars and industry professionals as to whether copyright law
should protect fashion designs. Advocates of the DPPA emphasize the
13
importance of fair treatment of fashion designs as creative works,
the need to avoid the commercial revenue and tax losses that result
from global design copyists, 14 and the benefits of harmonizing U.S. law

11.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 361; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 721. Professor Goodrich
asserts "that in the case of the legal community the sumptuary project lives on in manifold and
perhaps expanded forms." Id. Professor Hunt asserts that current laws banning certain drugs
and pornography are examples of sumptuary projects. HUNT, supra note 1, at 389-90. He
questions:
[T]he conventional wisdom that sumptuary law was doomed to failure and has no
place in the modern world. A more cautious version would be that even if sumptuary
law is no longer alive, then it has a habit of making many final curtain-calls, whether
in the guise of "Prohibition" or anti-pornography ordinances.
Id. at 389; see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part I.
12.
H.R. 2196, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). The proposed law was originally introduced
in 2006, H.R. 5055, 109th Cong. (2nd Sess. 2006), and then again in 2007, H.R. 2033, 110th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); S. 1957 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007), primarily through the lobbying
efforts of the Council of Fashion Designers of America. Hope Calder-Katz, Young Lawyers
Journal:How the Design Piracy ProhibitionAct Could Deter Copying of High Fashion: Piratesof
the Runway, 21 CHI. B. ASS'N REc. 44 (2007); Laura C. Marshall, Catwalk Copycats: Why
Congress Should Adopt a Modified Version of the Design Piracy ProhibitionAct, 14 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 305, 308-10 (2007); Olivera Mendenica, Bill Would Protect Fashion Designs, NAT'L L. J.
(N.Y.), Aug. 28, 2006, at S1. However, the West Coast California Fashion Association opposed
the extension of copyright protection to fashion design. Kellie Schmitt, Will Fashion Copyright
Suits Soon Be In Style?: A Bill Aimed at Knock-Off Dresses Is ForcingApparel-Industry Lawyers
to Choose Sides, RECORDER (S.F.), Aug. 22, 2007, at SF1, available at http://www.buchalter.com/
See
generally
Megan
bt/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=187&Itemid=57.
Williams, Comment, Fashioning a New Idea: How the Design Piracy Prohibition Act Is a
Reasonable Solution to the Fashion Design Problem, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 303, 31116 (providing substantive discussion of House report and key provisions of DPPA of 2007).
13.
Emily S. Day, Double-Edged Scissor: Legal Protection for FashionDesign, 86 N.C.L.
REV. 237, 252-55 (2007); Marshall, supra note 12, at 323-24; Brandon Scruggs, Comment, Should
FashionDesign Be Copyrightable?,6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 122, 130-31 (2007).
Day, supra note 13, at 238-39; Marshall, supra note 12, at 324-25; Scruggs, supra
14.
note 13, at 122; Lisa J. Hedrick, Note, Tearing FashionDesign Protection Apart at the Seams, 65
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 215, 217-18, 243-44 (2008); see also infra note 143 (defining "copyist").
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with other international intellectual property regimes. 15 Opponents of
copyright protection counter that such protection is both unnecessary
and harmful to an industry that thrives on copying fashion trends and
that promotes renewed creativity through the rapid development of
new fashions.16 Additionally, these critics posit that, since copyright
safeguards for fashion designs in less litigious countries have been
largely unenforced,17 adopting these safeguards could potentially lead
to expensive and time-consuming lawsuits in the United States'
litigious society.1s Furthermore, opponents are concerned that more
extensive copyright protection for fashion designs will result in an
increase in clothing costs and a reduction in fashion choices that will
hurt consumers.1 9

15.
Day, supra note 13, at 243, 266-68; Marshall, supra note 12, at 309, 317-20; Kal
Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox:Innovation and Intellectual Property in
FashionDesign, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1735-45 (2006); Hedrick, supra note 14, at 245-52; Scruggs,
supra note 13, at 132; Williams, supra note 12, at 315-17; Mendenica, supra note 12, at S1.
16.
DAVID BOLLIER & LAURIE RACINE, Ready to Share: Creativity in Fashion & Digital
Culture, in READY TO SHARE: FASHION & THE OWNERSHIP OF CREATIVITY 29, 34-35, 40-43 (David
Bollier & Laurie Racine eds., 2006); Marshall, supra note 12, at 320-22; Raustiala & Sprigman,
supra note 15, at 1715-1734; Williams, supra note 12, at 313-14. Professors Raustiala and
Sprigman coined the phrase "piracy paradox" to describe the phenomenon that the low legal
protection of the fashion industry actually helped to promote continued creativity and innovation
in the industry and greatly benefited the first-movers of a new fashion trend. Raustiala &
Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1691-92, 1727-29, 1759-62. The authors indicated that some creative
activities may occupy a "negative space" in that, despite the lack of intellectual property
protection, those industries continue to thrive in an environment of copying, including creative
cuisine, furniture designs, open source software, tattoos, and hairstyles. Id. at 1764-73. Although
their article leaves its conclusion regarding the protection of fashion designs open-ended with
questions for further intellectual property research, Professor Sprigman's testimony before
Congress in 2006 foreshadows their eventual opposition to extending copyright to fashion
designs. Design Piracy ProhibitionAct: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet and Intell. Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available
at
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pdflfaculty/sprigman-testimony.pdf
(statement
of
Prof.
Christopher Sprigman, Univ. of Va. School of Law) [hereinafter Sprigman Testimony]. See also
additional congressional testimony in opposition to DPPA, including Design Law - Are Special
ProvisionsNeeded to Protect Unique Industries?Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intell.Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 30 (2008) (statement of
Steve Maiman, co-owner of Stony Apparel) [hereinafter Maiman Testimony]; Design Piracy
ProhibitionAct: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and
Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), available at
http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdflwolfe-testimony-20060727.pdf (statement of David Wolfe,
Creative Director of The Doneger Group) [hereinafter Wolfe Testimony].
17.
Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1737, 1740-42, 1744; Hedrick, supra note
14, at 253-256; Schmitt, supra note 12, at SF1; see Wolfe Testimony, supra note 16, at 4.
18.
Wolfe Testimony, supranote 16, 3-4; Raustiala & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 174344; Hedrick, supranote 14, at 253-54; Schmitt, supra note 12, at SF1.
19.
Wolfe Testimony, supra note 16, at 4; Calder-Katz, supra note 12, at 55.
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Although strong arguments have been presented on both sides
of the issue, the debate surrounding copyright protection of fashion
designs often lacks a sense of historical context about past government
efforts to regulate dress. On the surface, the DPPA is aimed at
protecting the creative efforts of fashion designers from manufacturers
who copy and sell replicas of designers' creations to retailers.
Sumptuary laws mainly focus on the dress of citizens who purchased
and wore the goods. 20 However, the DPPA and sumptuary laws have
much more in common than the attempted regulation of clothing.
Appearing largely unbeknownst to the DPPA's Congressional
sponsors, 2 1 the underlying roots of the DPPA hearken back to some of
the core principles of sumptuary codes in ancient and medieval
European and Asian societies and colonial American society. These
principles include: promoting government control over social
identity, 22 reinforcing notions of public morality, 23 and implementing
increased economic protectionism 24 during periods of societal change
and uncertainty. 25 Drawing on Hunt's allegorical butterfly, the DPPA
can be viewed as a modern incarnation of sumptuary laws, dressed up
in new statutory garb.
Part I of this Article provides a brief overview of historical
sumptuary laws and addresses the main objectives and evolution of
these restrictive codes. 26 Part II illustrates the links between the
primary foundational tenets of these traditional sumptuary laws and
the objectives of the DPPA. 27 Part III cautions that traditional
sumptuary laws often suffered from a lack of public support and
compliance, as well as infrequent and half-hearted enforcement, while
simultaneously increasing demand for and piracy of the forbidden
items. 28 In Part IV, the Article concludes that, absent a better
understanding of the threads of our sumptuary past in our current
legal order, the DPPA, if enacted, would likely endure a similar fate to
earlier sumptuary laws; likely to be perceived as outdated and

20.
See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.
21.
See infra notes 44-71 and accompanying text.
22.
See infra notes 32, 72-101, 111 and accompanying text.
23.
See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Professor Hunt asserted that, since the
24.
fourteenth century, "sumptuary regulation had existed in a close symbiotic relationship with
protectionism." HUNT, supra note 1, at 324.
25.
See infra notes 56, 68 & 75 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 30-173 and accompanying text.
26.
27.
See infra notes 174-273 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 274-95 and accompanying text.
28.
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ineffective
government meddling
that will become
unenforceable in our individualistic, market-driven society.2 9
I.

A BRIEF

largely

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SUMPTUARY LAWS

A. Discourses on Social Order and the Visual Hierarchy in PreIndustrial Times
In ancient societies, sumptuary laws detailed how individuals
could spend their resources, particularly with respect to excessive
displays of clothing and to food consumption. 30 These laws typically
reflected paternalistic efforts by the government to stop citizens from
squandering their own limited resources, to prevent social competition
that might bankrupt people of modest means, and to ensure that
sufficient resources existed to pay tribute or taxes to the ruling
government authority. 31 These laws were often intertwined with
government moralizing about the displeasure of divine beings with
luxury and excess, and the dangers of spiritual corruption through
32
such inappropriate displays.
The earliest sumptuary laws focused primarily on funeral rites,
with restrictions on food consumption and mourning attire in ancient
Greek, 33 Roman, 34 and Confucian 35 societies. For example, ancient
29.
See discussion infra Part IV.
30.
BOUVIER, supra note 7, at 684; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
31.
BOUVIER, supra note 7, at 684; HUNT, supra note 1, at 299; Chaihark Hahm, Law,
Culture, and Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 253, 282-83 (2003).
32.
GILDRIE, supra note 7, at 22-23; HOFFER, supra note 7, at 46; Goodrich, supra note 4,
at 711-12; Hahm, supra note 31, at 282-83. For example, sumptuary laws grounded in the
religious ideals of modesty, thrift, and social conformity can be found in both Confucian, Hahm,
supra note 28, at 283, and New England Puritanical societies. GILDRIE, supra note 7, at 23-24,
194.
33.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 18-19. Earliest Greek sumptuary laws have been dated to the
sixth century BC. Id. at 18. In Athenian society, these regulations also sought to tamp down on
social disorder among competing clans that might flow from such public displays of clan wealth
and feverish mourning. Id. Extended public mourning rituals often involved women "wailing
[and] lacerating their faces and doing so in public." Id. These fervent emotional and physical
outbursts demonstrated the uncomfortably "close connection between the social power of
lamentations and the emotional tension needed to sustain the feuds and vendettas characteristic
of clan systems." Id. at 19.
34.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 19-21; Charlene Elliott, Purple Pasts: Color Codification in
the Ancient World, 33 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 173, 180 (2008). Some of the earliest Roman
sumptuary laws have been traced back to 450 BC. Id. at 19.
35.
See Hahm, supra note 31, at 282-83 (discussing the role of sumptuary codes in
Confucian funeral rituals in Korea). Prof. Hahm notes that some of the most enduring Confucian
family rituals in Korean society date back to the Song Dynasty and the teachings of Master, Zhu
Xi (1130-1200). Not until 1998 did the Korean Constitutional Courts find portions of these
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Greek and Roman sumptuary laws imposed limitations on the value
and amount of food consumed at a funeral. 36 Greek laws allowed
female mourners a maximum of "three mourning shawls,"3 7 while
Roman laws required those in mourning to wear black or dark-colored
fabrics.3 8 Similarly, Confucian sumptuary laws regulated the type
and quantity of food that people could consume at a funeral and
spelled out the precise color and fabric of appropriate clothing for
funeral rituals. 39 These Confucian regulations were intended to avoid
"turning
these
occasions
into
lavish
and
ostentatious
extravaganzas."' 40
Subsequently, pre-modern Confucian societies
extended sumptuary laws to regulate other family social rituals, such
as weddings, 4 1 and delineated the number, fabric, and color of
garments 42 that were permitted to be worn for these occasions which
43
endured until the 1980s.
In addition, sumptuary laws pertaining to dress have played an
active role in identifying and codifying one's position in the social
hierarchy, since the social elites believed that attire should reflect an
individual's occupation, class, gender, race, and ethnicity. 44 For
ancient sumptuary laws limiting food and drinks at certain family events an unconstitutional
violation of the "general freedom of action." Id. at 283. The Court overturned the entire law with
all of its prescriptions, but societal norms still keep many of the earlier law's traditions alive in
modern Korea. Id. at 286-287.
36.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 18-20.
37.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 18.
38.
Elliott, supranote 34, at 181.
39.
Hahm, supranote 31, at 281-82.
40.
Id. at 282-83.
41.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 19, 26; Hahm, supra note 31, at 282-83.
42.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 19. Ancient Greek societies limited a bride to "three robes in
her trousseau" and even regulated "the value of dowries and the price of presents" at weddings.
Id.
43.
Hahm, supra note 31, at 281-83; see also Malla Pollack, Your Image Is My Image:
When Advertising Dedicates Trademarks to the Public Domain - With an Example From the
Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392, 1422-26 (discussing
communicative nature of trademarks in context of traditional sumptuary laws). See generally
Elliott, supra note 34, at 178-86 (providing an excellent review of sumptuary laws regulating
fabric color and material throughout ancient history, with special emphasis on highly-prized
color of purple). Professor Elliott notes that color codification efforts under ancient sumptuary
laws were the forerunners of modern efforts to color trademark symbols that have achieved a
secondary meaning in the marketplace. Id. at 192.
44.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 3-4; HUNT, supra note 1, at 27, 38-39; Capers, supra note 6,
at 6-8; Matthew W. Finkin, Menschenbild: The Conception of the Employee as a Person in
Western Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 577, 593 (2002); Jeffery A. Roy, Carolene Products: A
Game-Theoretic Approach, 2002 BYU L. REV. 53, 90 n. 129; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 718-20.
While one's dress socially communicates many messages, sumptuary laws played an active role
in institutionally supporting and enforcing these meanings in the social hierarchy for centuries
throughout the world. CRANE, supra note 1, at 3-4; HUNT, supra note 1, at 27, 38-39; Capers,
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example, in Greek, Roman, and Confucian societies, wealthy and
politically powerful people subsequently broadened the scope of
sumptuary laws controlling expenditures at social rites to regulate the
daily dress of the lower classes. 45 They did so in an effort to display
each citizen's place in the social hierarchy and to suppress any
perceived upward pressures for shared power and equality originating
in the lower classes. 46
Ancient Roman society exemplifies the early recognition of the
power of clothing to convey a host of secondary social meanings about
an individual. 47 For over four hundred years, sumptuary laws
governed the fabric and color of togas, which instantly signified a
person's social identity and status. 48 Average citizens were expected
to wear plain, natural wool togas, while only senators were permitted
49
to wear white woolen togas with purple hems and red sleeves.
Candidates for office similarly wore white woolen togas without
51
colored sleeves or hems. 50 Mourners wore black or dark tinged togas.
Togas also conveyed military rank-generals wore purple and gold
woolen togas, other officers donned plain purple cloaks, while ordinary
soldiers wore red cloaks.5 2 In addition, only the Roman emperor was
permitted to wear purple silk with gold embroidery, and violators of
this rule were punished by death. 53
Therefore, under Roman
sumptuary laws, "[c]olor and cloth distinguish[ed] citizen from

supra note 6, at 6-8; Finkin, supra, at 593; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 718-20; Roy, supra, at 90 &
n. 129;
45.
Elliott, supra note 34, at 186-87; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 713; Pollack, supra note
43, at 1424.
46.
See supra note 45.
47.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 42, 72; Elliott, supra note 34, at 181, 183-85; see Capers,
supra note 6, at 6 ("Clothing after all is communication: something that can be said, something
that can be understood, something that can be read,").
48.
Elliott, supra note 34, at 181; Pnina Lahav, Theater in the Courtroom: The Chicago
Conspiracy Trial, 16 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 381, 432-33 (2004).
49.
Elliott, supranote 34, at 181; see Lahav, supranote 48, at 433-34.
50.
Elliott, supra note 34, at 181.
51.
Id.
52.
Id.
53.
Id. at 181, 184. In ancient Rome, to own or wear royal purple textiles or simulation
of that hue that was reserved to the emperor "was tantamount to ...plotting against the state"
and "involvement in a crime similar to that of high treason." Id. at 183-84. Later in the 1600s,
English sumptuary law also restricted the wearing of the color purple or gold-colored cloth to the
royal families. Paul Raffield, Contract, Classicism, and the Common-Weal: Coke's Report and the
Foundationsof the Modern English Constitution, 17 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 69, 87 (2005).
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candidate, mourner from general... [a]t a glance or a distance."5 4
Efforts to enact and enforce sumptuary laws increased as the
economic and military power of the Roman Empire began to falter and
55
fall into decline.
Actually, the passage and enforcement of sumptuary laws
were often at their zenith in periods of social, political, or economic
upheaval or flux. 5 6 In such times, ruling classes fervently sought to
protect their privileged positions in society, 57 either by privileging
higher-status groups to wear particular clothing or by prohibiting
lower classes from donning certain attire. 58 Therefore, sumptuary

54.
Elliott, supra note 34, at 181. Quoting Pulitzer Prize-winning author Alison Lurie,
Professor Capers concurs that clothing silently communicates a variety of meanings, even from a
distance.
For thousands of years human beings have communicated with one another first in
the language of dress. Long before I am near enough to talk to you on the street, in a
meeting, or at a party, you announce your sex, age and class to me through what you
are wearing - and very possibly give me important information (or misinformation) as
to your occupation, origin, personality, opinions, tastes, sexual desires, and current
mood. I may not be able to put what I observe into words, but I register the
information unconsciously; and you simultaneously do the same for me. By the time
we meet and converse we have already spoken to each other in an older and more
universal tongue.
Capers, supra note 6, at 6 (quoting ALISON LURIE, THE LANGUAGE OF CLOTHES 3 (1981)).

55.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 21-22.
56.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 20-22; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 708-10; Raffield, supra note
55, at 86-87; Matthew Gayle, Note, Female By Operation of Law: Feminist Jurisprudenceand the
Legal Imposition of Sex, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 737, 742-43 (2006).
57.
According to Professor Hunt,
Style wars are class wars; they are made up of battles over dress, fashion and
appearance. A striking feature of a great bulk of sumptuary law is that it was directed
at conceptions and images of the social order. It was concerned with attempts to
protect hierarchical conceptions of social relations, to resist some of the most directly
visible manifestations of rising social groups either challenging or undermining the
incumbents of advantaged social positions. Sumptuary laws revolved around
resistance to those innovations and changes that were judged to be inconsistent with
the prevalent vision of the social order.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 143.
58.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 27; see Elliott, supra note 34, at 178-80, 187. Professor Hunt
also indicates that one can infer from these two approaches that
[R]eserved privileges tend to be associated with the internal regulation of a social
hierarchy where the concern is to limit or channel competition that occurs within the
dominant classes. The negative prohibition tends to be associated with the imposition
of an imagined social order on real or imagined disruptions or challenges from below.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 27. In many instances, women's dress was specially regulated as a key
mechanism of social control over their conduct. Id. at 18-20; Goodrich, supra note 4, at 711, 71516. In Greek funerals, women were limited to "three mourning shawls" and were prohibited from
excessive displays of mourning, such as lacerating their cheeks. HUNT, supra note 1, at 18.
Similarly, Roman sumptuary laws restricted women to "ornaments of half an ounce of gold" and
prohibited "the wearing of multicolored robes" or being conveyed through the city in a chariot. Id.
at 20. Professor Hunt recognizes that sumptuary laws applied broadly to both men and women,
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laws, "when enforced, bolstered the visual hierarchy," 59 permitting an
individual's place in society to be immediately recognized. 60 This
approach to sumptuary laws was later adopted in European,
61
Japanese, and colonial American societies.
Sumptuary laws evolved with the times and continued to
impose social control and identification through dress in medieval and
renaissance Europe,62 as well as in various parts of Asia in the
1800s. 63 Sumptuary codes became less about prohibiting excessive
consumption and more about protecting the privileges of ruling classes
and guarding social boundaries through strict dress codes.6 4 The citybut tended to be more stringently enforced against women. Id. at 27-28. Some cultural theorists
have also criticized the goals of sumptuary laws as socio-legal creations that seek to enforce
social constructs of gender identity. Capers, supra note 6, at 8-9; Katherine M. Franke, The
Central Mistake of Sex DiscriminationLaw: The Disaggregationof Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1, 69 (1995); Gayle, supra note 56, at 743-44.
Elliott, supra note 34, at 187 (quoting anthropologist Jane Schneider who undertook
59.
significant research on clothing's ability to "communicate meanings").
See supra notes 44-55, 59.
60.
GILDRIE, supra note 7, at 24, 35; HOFFER, supra note 7, at 46; HUNT, supra note 1, at
61.
27, 38-39; Finkin, supra note 44, at 593 n. 92; Roy, supra note 44, at 90 n. 129. Mr. Gayle
indicates that the need for individual categorization has created, in both society and the law, an
interest in policing the boundaries between identity categories. Gayle, supra note 56, at 742
(footnotes omitted).This anxiety with maintaining hierarchical order has been present
throughout Western history. Id. In medieval Europe, Elizabethan England, and colonial
America, sumptuary laws-namely, enforcing different dress codes for people of different
economic classes-were intended to ensure clear class distinctions during times when economic
change threatened to blur class lines. Id. In other words, these dress code laws "sought to insure
social legibility and enforce social hierarchy." Id.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 27, 28-29, 36; Finkin, supra note 44, at 593 n. 92; Pollack,
62.
supra note 43, at 1424; Roy, supra note 44, at 90 n. 129. Despite the varied political systems and
the divisions between Catholic and Protestant denominations, sumptuary laws were common in
most European countries from the eleventh through the seventeenth century. HUNT, supra note
1, at 36.
Roy, supra note 44, at 90 n. 129. Professor Roy interestingly notes that in the 1800s
63.
Turkish law required people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds to wear a particular
type of hat to identify their background. "Greeks wore dark caps; Armenians, balloon-shaped
headdresses; Jews wore brimless caps; and Turks, a red fez." Id. Japan was also known for its
detailed and exacting sumptuary laws based on one's social position. Id.
Capers, supranote 6, at 7. Professor Capers notes that
64.
[Clities, towns, and nation states routinely promulgated laws that regulated who wore
what, and on what occasion. These sumptuary laws - the term sumptuary relating to
consumption - were not limited to minimizing consumption or even conspicuous
consumption. Rather, they "manifested an aspiration to construct an 'order of
appearance' that allowed the relevant social facts, in particular about social and
economic status, gender and occupation to be 'read' from the visible signs disclosed by
the clothes on the wearer." More importantly, many of these laws served to inscribe
and police social boundaries. Consumption was monitored, but so was assumption. It
was not only that those of a lower status should not adorn themselves with the clothes
or accoutrements of their betters; it was also that, by so clothing themselves, those of
the lower classes would not assume the status of their betters.
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state of Venice is particularly well-known for some of the most
elaborate and long-lived sumptuary codes, which were enacted in the
late thirteenth century and continued through the eighteenth
66
century. 65 Like the ancient Greek, Roman, and Confucian codes,
Venetian sumptuary laws were originally grounded in consumption
limits for funerals and weddings. 67 As Venetian society weathered a
number of economic and political crises, its Senate began to enact
detailed laws about "dress materials, the size and design of sleeves,
fringes and ornaments, belts and headdresses, shoes and slippers,
68
home furnishings and bed-linen" based on one's station in society.
Jews were also forced to display yellow chest cords to identify
themselves. 69 The moral objective of modesty in displays of apparel
and parts of the body exposed along with the protection of citizens
from wasteful spending and the payment of taxes became the primary
rallying cries to promote the passage and enforcement of Venetian
sumptuary laws. 70 The codes expressed clear anxiety over increasing

Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting HUNT, supra note 1, at 42); see also Lahav, supra note 48, at 43334 (contending that Chicago Seven defendants donned judicial robes at one point in trial not to
imitate judge, but to remind judge of due process obligations owed to them under justice system).
65.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 36.
66.
See supranotes 33-43.

67.

Id.

68.
Id. at 36-37. Over time, even the decoration and upholstering of gondolas did not
escape the attention of these sumptuary laws. Id. at 37. In addition, Venetian sumptuary law
banned "dark-blue or green raiment to encourage general happiness" after the plague of 1347-48.
Id. at 36.
69.
Capers, supra note 6, at 8; see Roy, supra note 44, at 90. Professor Roy examined
how law can be employed to make hidden traits readily observable through symbols worn over
clothing.
Historically, members of a majority have occasionally tried to make unobservable
traits evident in order to accord reduced status to people with those traits. For
example, in Nazi Germany prisoners were marked with colored triangles
corresponding to the reasons for their incarceration. A green triangle marked its
wearer as a regular criminal, and a red triangle denoted a political prisoner. Jewish
prisoners were marked with two overlapping yellow triangles forming a star of David,
and homosexuals were marked with a pink triangle. Homosexuals bearing a pink
triangle were assigned to the most difficult labor. Similarly, while wealth is not
inherently observable, in the past, law and/or social custom dictated the clothing and
behavior of different classes of society, making them readily identifiable.
Id. at 90 (footnotes omitted).
70.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 36-37. A review of Venetian treasury documents shows that
they are replete with records of fines for breaches of sumptuary codes. Id. at 36. However, verbal
rebukes from the court were the most common form of punishment. Id. at 350. It is interesting to
note that a study of Florentine documents during this same time periodindicates that women
were more often prosecuted and fined for violating sumptuary dress codes. Id. at 344.
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"class fluidity" and supported the desire to control social status
71
through legislation.
B. English Sumptuary Codes and the Evolving Role of Economic
Protectionism
A more direct predecessor to U.S. sumptuary laws, English
sumptuary codes on dress emphasized a visual hierarchy, as well as
the immorality of conspicuous consumption and spending beyond one's
However, English sumptuary laws also included
means. 72
nationalistic considerations that were not found in earlier sumptuary
history. In 1337, the first English sumptuary law linked moralizing
about the vice of excessive consumption with economic protectionism
and the protection of the national interest. 73 Not surprisingly, this act
was passed during a time of political upheaval, when England was
about to plunge into the tumultuous Hundred Years' War with
France.7 4 Like the sumptuary codes of earlier societies, the 1337 law
sought to prevent the property-owning classes from squandering their
resources and the lower classes from impoverishing themselves in
their attempts to imitate the upper classes. 75 To this end, the law
76
banned anyone below the rank of knight or lady from wearing fur
and prohibited knights from wearing ermine, a specific type of fur that
could be donned only by the highest ranks of nobility.7 7 The law also
had protectionist aims, prohibiting anyone but the royal family from
wearing any clothing not made in the England, Ireland, Wales, or
Scotland. 78
Finally, it included provisions that forbade the
importation of foreign wool, a further attempt to bolster the British
economy and royal coffers at the expense of foreign nations,
79
particularly France.

Id. at 173. Professor Hunt opines that these laws sought to address "these deep71.
seated, multi-dimensional problems of the shifting class relations on the borders of modernity."

Id.
Id. at 299, 301-02, 367; see Goodrich, supra note 4, at 709; Pollack, supra note 43, at
72.
1422-23.
73.
HUNT, supra note 1.
74.
Id. at 299, 301.
Id.
75.
76.
Id. at 299.
Id. at 304.
77.
78.
Id. at 301. This import ban was aimed at merchants who might bring in foreign wool
and held the extreme punishment of either loss of life or limb for violating the law. Id.

79.

Id.
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In 1363, the English government passed "A Statute Concerning
Diet and Apparel," the one of the most comprehensive, hierarchical
set of sumptuary laws in English history, with dress categories based
on one's societal rank and the economic value of his or her estate. 0
This set of laws was enacted in response to complaints from social
elites about the "outrageous and excessive apparel of divers [sic]
people against their estate and degree," in that "labourers use[d] the
apparel of craftsmen, and craftsmen the apparel of valets, and valets
the apparel of squires, and squires the apparel of knight."8' For the
first time, English sumptuary law began to reflect a recognition that
the traditional notion of social rank based on bloodline was under
pressure from social power based upon economic wealth.8 2 To stave off
that change, the 1363 law sought to hold down the rising economic
power of the merchant class by mandating that merchants' estates
must be valued at five times more than that of knights in order for
83
merchants to wear noble garb.
The next major sumptuary law in England was not passed
until 1463, but it once more pressed the twin concerns of immorality4
8
and economic protectionism in its hierarchical regulation of dress.
The law detailed the colors and types of fabrics that individuals could
wear based on their rank in society.8 5 No one below the rank of knight
was allowed to wear velvet, satin, silk (or imitations of silk), or
or higher were permitted
ermine, and only those with the rank of Lord
86
silk.
purple
and
sables,
cloth,
to wear gold
In the 1500s and early 1600s, English sumptuary laws followed
the patterns spelled out by these earlier statutes. In some instances,
they added more complex restrictions related to specific social
gradations and the nature of the fabrics and colors that could be

Id. at 303
80.
Id. (old English spellings in original).
81.
Id. at 163. Professor Hunt states that "[in both New England and much earlier in
82.
Europe, there was a progressive move away from the definition of social position by blood
towards the 'new' economic criterion of 'income."' Id.
Id. at 304-05.
83.
Id. at 306. The preamble states that
84.
[t]he commons of the said realm, as well Men as Women, have worn and daily do wear
excessive and inordinate Array and Apparel to the great Displeasure of God, and
impoverishing of this realm of England and to the enriching of other strange Realms
and Countries to the final Destruction of Husbandry of this said Realm.
Id.; see Goodrich, supra note 4, at 709.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 307.
85.

86.

Id.
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worn. 87 In other instances, the new provisions were aimed at
88
supporting the domestic textile industry.
The tumultuous Elizabethan era, during which the monarchy
89
and the House of Commons battled internally over legislative power, 90
was marked by "a veritable frenzy of regulatory lawmaking,
including regulation of wages, prices, clothing, occupations, religious
observances, and familial, social, and commercial relationships. 91
During this period, the greatest numbers of royal proclamations about
dress were handed down, aimed primarily at reaffirming the existing
social order. 92 However, despite centuries of sumptuary dress codes,
legal records show little evidence of any consistent prosecution of
these laws in the English judicial system.9 3 During the Elizabethan
period, sumptuary laws as to dress were often ineffective because their
stated objectives often yielded the exact opposite reaction in the

87.
Id. at 309-16.
88.
Id. For example the "Proclamation Against Excess in Apparel" indicated that no one
shall wearcloth of gold, silver, or tinsel; satin, silk, or cloth mixed with gold or silver, nor any
sables; except earls and all of superior degrees, and viscounts and barons in their doublets and
sleeveless coats; woolen cloth made out of the realm; velvet, crimson, scarlet or blue; furs, black
genets, lucerns; except dukes, marquises, earls or their children, barons, and knights of the
order; velvet in gowns, coats, or outermost garments; furs of leopards; embroidery, pricking or
printing with gold, silver or silk; except baron's sons, knights, or men that may dispend £200 by
year; taffeta, satin, damask, or silk camlet in his outermost garments; velvet, otherwise than in
jackets, doublets, etc., fur whereof the groweth not within the Queen's dominions, except grey
genets, bodge; except a man may dispend by £100 year. Id. at 314-15.
89.
Id. at 312. During the Elizabethan period (1558-1603), royal rule and secular
government authority vied for political pre-eminence. Id.; see infra notes 91-100 and
accompanying text.
90.
HOFFER, supra note 7, at 46.
91.
Id. Professor Hoffer states that
[n]early every session of Parliament enacted new statutes to control domestic conduct
and economic activity. Prices were regulated, as was the gold thread in one's clothing,
the language of one's prayers, the occupation one could follow, and the profits one
could make. Statutes of Artificers fixed wages, and Poor Laws set up workhouses for
the indigent. The relations between master and apprentice, servant and employer,
husband and wife were regulated as well.
Id.
92.
Capers, supra note 6, at 7; see HUNT, supra note 1, at 315-21 (providing further
detail on the sumptuary proclamations of the Elizabethan period). It is interesting to note that a
1562 proclamation included language mandating that tailors and hosiers limit the amount of
cloth used in men's hosiery or else suffer a fine, Id. at 316, perhaps an early example of
secondary liability if placed in the copyright context. The Elizabethan era also saw the
reinstatement of gender-specific dress codes for men and women. Id. at 320-21; Capers, supra
note 6, at 8; see supra note 57 and accompanying text; see also Finkin, supra note 44, at 593 n.92
(citing Bavarian ordinance that in 1537 that mandated citizens wear clothing suitable to their
station in order "to be recognized for whome [sic] he or she is").
93.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 342-43. Professor Hunt concludes that the enforcement of
sumptuary laws "was episodic, irregular and probably unpredictable." Id. at 343.

2009]

SUMPTUARY IMPULSE AND DPPA

public. 94 Limiting a certain fashion item to the upper classes instantly
made it more desirable for the lower classes; conversely, requiring the
general public to don a certain item resulted in it becoming
immediately unfashionable for the lower classes. 95 For example, the
1337 law banning imported wool actually caused a rise in the public
demand for imported wool and increased wool smuggling. 96 Yet wool
caps became completely undesirable to the public after a 1571 law
mandated that anyone over the age of six wear one on Sundays and
holidays. 97 It is this "fundamental contradiction" that seems to doom
sumptuary regulations, particularly regulations as to dress. 98 As
Professor Hunt has stated,
[a] fundamental contradiction lies at the core of the project of sumptuary regulation ....
To designate some item of dress or some dish of food as being reserved for others is
unlikely to reduce the desire to consume such items on the part of the rest of the
population, or at least of those sections of the population within whose economic reach
If some economic or cultural asset is restricted to some
or imagination such items lie ....
groups or classes it becomes a potential object of aspiration for others. Such an
aspiration is9 reinforced where that asset is associated with a claim to social
9
superiority.

Still, in spite of their ineffectiveness, it was not until the first
Parliament of 1604 that English sumptuary laws on dress began to be
repealed, not as the direct target of Parliament for a specific reason,
but as a byproduct of a general overhaul of existing statutory codes. 100

94.
Id. at 102-05.
95.
Id. Professor Hunt indicates that he was not the first to recognize this issue, quoting
French essayist Michel de Montaigne who wrote in 1572 that "[t]o say that none but princes
shall eat turbot; or shall be allowed to wear velvet and gold braid, and to forbid them to the
people, what else is this but to give prestige to these things and to increase everyone's desire to
enjoy them?" Id. at 102.
96.
Id. at 299-301.
97.
Id. at 104-05.
98.
Id. at 102; see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 102.
99.
Id. at 321. A number of sumptuary laws regarding dress were proposed throughout
100.
the early 1600s but most did not survive the legislative process. Id. at 322-23. Oddly enough, in
1666, one dress law did pass with an explicitly protectionist goal for English wool, mandating
that all deceased persons must be buried in wool shrouds and not from imported fabrics such as
"flax, hemp, silk, hair gold or silver thread, or lining coffins with these materials." Id. at 323.
This act brought English law back full circle with ancient Greek, Roman and Confucian
sumptuary codes and their initial emphases on funereal restrictions. See id. at 323; supra notes
31-35 and accompanying text. The law also sought to limit the importation of French textiles,
HUNT, supra note 1, at 323, another example of the recurring theme of economic protectionism.
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C. Sinfulness, Social Station, and Income in Colonial America
As English sumptuary dress codes waned, colonial America,
lacking an entrenched ruling royal class, sought to establish its own
visual hierarchy through dress. 10 1 Colonial sumptuary laws were
modeled after their English predecessors and focused more heavily on
"a moral agenda [of] social conformity, religious obedience, and hard
work"'1 2 in line with Puritan values connecting the "evils of luxury,
fashion, and dressing above one's rank"10 3 with the sins of idleness and
pride. 10 4 In New England, Puritan ministers regularly railed against
covetousness and corruption of society through materialism and the
sin of "spiritual pride" in pursuit of fashion.105
Beginning in 1619, the Massachusetts Bay Colony gradually
adopted a comprehensive set of sumptuary laws of all of the
colonies. 10 6 These efforts to regulate dress later included a 1651 ban
on the ownership of gold and silver lace or buttons, silk hoods or
scarves, and "great boots"'1 7 for those with less than £200 in annual
income. 0 8 Like earlier English sumptuary laws, the 1651 law
included an income component to determine a person's rank, a
controlling factor to determine one's right to don particular items; this
101.
BROWN, supra note 7, at 89-90; HUNT, supranote 1, at 38.
102.
HOFFER, supra note 7, at 46.
103.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 39; see Pollack, supra note 43, at 1424.
104.
GILDRIE, supra note 7, at 35; see Finkin, supranote 44, at n. 92.
105.
GILDRIE, supra note 7, at 23, 35. In the 1600s, leading Puritan ministers actively
lobbied the Massachusetts legislature for the passage of sumptuary laws, linking consumption
with illicit sensuality. Id. at 24-25, 35-37. Minister William Hubbard denounced "commodities to
make fuel for lust" and warning that materialism is "calling young people not to the mountain of
the Lords House, but our own private recesses to offer sacrifice to Bacchus and Venus." Id. at
194; see Goodrich, supra note 4, at 713-15 (discussing efforts to suppress erotic images through
sumptuary regulations).
106.
See HOFFER, supra note 7, at 47; HUNT, supra note 1, at 38; see also BROWN, supra
note 7, at 89-90 (discussing role of sumptuary codes of dress in colonial Virginia in seeking to
sustain hierarchical social order).
107.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 39, 103-04. In a decision, one Massachusetts magistrate
wrote:
We declare our utter detestation and dislike that men and women of mean condition,
educations, and callings should take upon themselves the garb of gentlemen, by the
wearing of gold and silver lace, or buttons, or points at their knees, to walk in great
boots; or women of the same rank to wear tiffany [transparent silk or muslim] hoods
or scarves, which though allowable to persons of greater estates, or more liberal
education, yet we cannot but judge it intolerable in persons of such like condition.
Id. at 103 (addition in original); see supra note 93 and accompanying text; infra notes 109, 111,
281 and accompanying text.
108.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 39, 163-64; Capers, supra note 6, at 7. To help enforce dress
regulations, local authorities were permitted to tax persons who dared to wear clothing above
their station as if their incomes exceeded £200 in annual income. HUNT, supra note 1, at 39.
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largely replaced the notion of social status through bloodlines, which
was not easily transferred from European to American society. 10 9
Other colonies also adopted their own sumptuary laws on dress, often
with heavy moral overtones about the dangers of immodesty or
idleness. 110
As in England, enforcement of these laws was inconsistent,
occurring in sporadic bursts whenever a new sumptuary law was
passed or a particularly zealous government official took office.1 11 As
was likely the case in ancient societies, women tended to be more
1 12
regularly prosecuted than men for violating these colonial laws,
with excesses in female apparel seen as a dangerous sign of
"suspicious female independence." 113 Consistent with Hunt's notion of
the "fundamental contradiction" of sumptuary regulation,1 1 4 colonial
American sumptuary laws regulating dress often provoked the
opposite of their intended response from the public. 115 For example, a
Massachusetts law banning women whose annual household incomes
were under £200 from wearing silk hoods yielded a tremendous
demand for these items as well as a flurry of prosecutions for
BROWN, supra note 7, at 89-90; HUNT, supra note 1, at 104, 163. With regard to
109.
colonial Virginia, Professor Brown writes:
Lacking the visible trappings of ancient status and power, as expressed in manor
houses, imported clothing, and horses, the wealthy planters of the Company and early
colony found it difficult to communicate to lesser men the authority to which they
aspired ....Manual laborers who dressed above their station, creating an appearance
of gentility when in fact they herded cattle or mined coal, were a social threat with
some precedent in England ....The response of the wealthy planters to violations of
dress distinctions was to do as their elite peers in England had done: to pass laws
prohibiting excesses in clothing . . . . Even more than in England, where stately
houses, carriages, trappings of government office, and traditions of local rule
expressed aristocratic and gentry rights to rule over yeomen and laborers, clothing
became a crucial signpost of status in early Virginia.
BROWN, supranote 7, at 89-90.
110.
BROWN, supra note 7, at 89-90; HUNT, supra note 1, at 39.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 345, 347. Professor Hunt notes that, in colonial America, in
111.
most instances these laws, if enforced, were "almost always against the lower classes." Id. at 347.
112.
See id. at 345-46, 353. The wearing of silk hoods seemed to be a consistent offense of
women brought before the Massachusetts courts for sumptuary code violations. Id. at 346, 353.
Fines were the traditional method for punishing such violations. Id. at 349; see supra note 70
and accompanying text.
GILDRIE, supra note 7, at 99. Professor Brown notes that, in colonial Virginia, "[a]
113.
woman's clothing also revealed her occupation, status, and gentility or servility." BROWN, supra
note 7, at 292. She adds that for free women with financial means "clothing provided a unique
opportunity to communicate one's identity and one's worth independently of one's husband or
father. Fashion was also the most important idiom in which elite colonial women expressed their
relationship to imperial culture. A woman's wardrobe reflected not only her financial position but
her taste." Id. at 293.
114.
See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
See HUNT, supra note 1, at 345-47, 353.
115.
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violations of the law, some in groups of thirty or more women at a
time. 116 Ultimately, enforcement of sumptuary laws was most
effective in colonial America when the citizens of the colony generally,
and not just a specific group, benefited from the rules, as in the case of
price limits on food, or grade and weight regulations on tobacco that
promoted fairness to both merchants and consumers.11 7
In addition to laws restricting the dress of ordinary citizens,
slave codes in certain colonies mandated that slaves be limited to
certain fabrics, both to ensure immediate identification of the

individual as a slave 1 8 and to avoid stoking "theire foolish pride as
induse them to steal fine Linninge and other ornaments." 19 The
colonial Virginia law required masters to dress their slaves in coarse
canvas linen in hues of blue.1 20 The South Carolina slave codes
detailed a variety of cheap, rough fabrics "not exceeding ten shillings
per yard" for masters to clothe their slaves. 121 Professor I. Bennett
Capers notes that, under these slave dress codes, "[iut was not enough
that their skin marked them subordinate in the eyes of whites; their
clothing had to mark them as subordinate as well."' 22 The visual
hierarchy was thus doubly protected through clothing and skin color
with the goal of supporting the existing social order. 123
Due to changing social values and improved class mobility,
traditional sumptuary laws regulating dress, with the exception of
slave codes, began to be repealed or were no longer actively enforced
by the middle of the eighteenth century. 24 During the nineteenth
century, sumptuary laws transformed into an increased demand for
uniforms in the work place to help identify members of the working
class and to further retain the visual hierarchy that was no longer
mandated by law.125 The use of uniforms flourished and helped to
116.
See id. In the case of Hannah Lyman, she was fined and censured for wearing a silk
hood in public and for showing contempt for the law by wearing that same hood in the
courtroom, when she appeared along with thirty-five other women being prosecuted. Id. at 353.
117.
See HOFFER, supra note 7, at 47.
118.
BROWN, supra note 7, at 154; see CRANE, supra note 1, at 69.
119.
BROWN, supra note 7, at 154 (old English spellings in original); Capers, supra note 6,
at 8.
120.

BROWN, supra note 7, at 154.

121.

Capers, supra note 6, at 8.

122.

Id.

123.
BROWN, supranote 7, at 154; Capers, supra note 6, at 8.
124.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 39.
125.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 87-88, 94. Professor Crane notes that "[flashionable clothing,
which could be used to enhance the individual's social capital, was mainly accessible to the
middle and upper class during the nineteenth century, while uniforms that represented
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identify three distinct groups: public employees (such as police officers
and firefighters), domestic servants, and factory and shop workers.126
In the aftermath of slave dress codes, workplace dress codes now
played a key role in maintaining the visual hierarchy for working
adults.127
D. Social Norms and ChangingFashion Diffusion Models
As sumptuary laws faded in the United States in the
eighteenth century, discourse on morality and dress gave way to the
development of class norms that created distinct social rules about
appropriate dress. 128 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, wealth provided the upper class with access to the latest
fashions, and designers created fashions primarily so their elite
customers could express their social positions. 129 During this period,
social status and economic ability to purchase fashionable dress
supplanted the prohibitions and privileges of sumptuary laws. 130 As
clothing became more readily available to the public, strict social
instruments of social control were imposed primarily on employees drawn from the working
class." Id. at 94.
126.
Id. at 87. Furthermore, the highly ornamental and restrictive fashions of this time
period, such as tight corsets and long trains, were aimed at limiting wealthy women's physical
activities, resulting in "fashionable clothing [that] was unsuitable for the daily activities of most
working-women." Id. at 29. The assumptions underlying these restraining fashions were notions
that physical labor was bad for a lady's health and that such menial tasks were to be performed
by one's servants. Id. "Aristocratic idleness was seen as the suitable way of life for middle- and
upper-class women." Id.
127.
Although our society today largely views itself free from government (and/or
religious) edicts on dress, Professor Kare states that employers now have taken over the societal
authority to institute dress codes for adults. Klare, supra note 6, at 1431-32. He notes that "[t]he
genius of appearance law as discipline lies in indirection and decentralization" that creates the
illusion, but not the reality, of free choice in dress. Id. In addition, schools may have the
authority to broadly regulate student dress provided that their actions do not transgress free
speech rights. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(determining that school's suspension of students from school for wearing black armbands to
protest governmental policy in Vietnam violated the First Amendment); Newsom ex rel. Newsom
v. Albemarle County Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding school dress code policy too
broad and a violation of student's free speech right to wear N.R.A. sports shooting camp t-shirt);
Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2001) (determining that school dress
code requiring uniforms sought to improve test scores and reduce disciplinary problems and did
not violate free speech rights); Bivens v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 899 F. Supp. 556 (D.N.M. 1995),
aff-d, 131 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision) (upholding student suspension
for saggy pants violation of school dress code as not violating free expression rights).
128.
See CRANE, supra note 1, at 6, 134; Diana Crane, Diffusion Models and Fashion: A
Reassessment, 566 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 13, 17 (1999).
129.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 28-29, 94.
130.
See id.
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norms about who could wear particular items and when they could
wear them took the place of laws. The penalty of social ostracization
131
for nonconformity now helped to police class and gender boundaries.
Starting in the late nineteenth century, "class" fashion dictated
by these social norms ruled with a centralized system of fashion
design and manufacturing, largely operating out of Paris, dictating
acceptable fashion to an unquestioning public. 132 Under historically
recognized fashion diffusion models, fashion trends traditionally
emanated from the wealthy upper classes and then subsequently
trickled down to status-seeking members of the middle and lower
classes. 13 3 Under the traditional trickle down or top-down model,
Professor Diana Crane, a fashion industry expert, has stated that
[1]ower-status groups sought to acquire status by adopting the clothing of higher-status
groups and set in motion a process of social contagion whereby styles are adopted
successively by groups at successively inferior status levels. By the time a particular
fashion reached the working class, the upper class had adopted newer styles, since the
previous style had lost its appeal in the process of popularization. The higher-status
groups sought once
again to differentiate themselves from their inferiors by adopting
13 4
new fashions.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
availability of less expensive industrial imitation fabrics and the

131.
Id. at 4, 67, 134; Crane, supra note 128, at 17. For example, Vogue's Book of
Etiquette in 1948 originated the social norm of a lady only wearing white between Memorial Day
and Labor Day, a norm still discussed today in fashion circles. See, e.g., Reader Response: White
After Labor Day, ETIQUETTEER, Sept. 16, 2007, http://www.etiquetteer.com/category/white-afterlabor-day/.
132.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 134. Parisian designers determined the correct styles year
after year and implicitly established norms for proper dress, especially for women. Id.
133.
BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 31; CRANE, supra note 1, at 6-7; HUNT, supra
note 1, at 50. This "top-down" model is often attributed to sociologist George Simmel in his 1904
study of fashion diffusion. CRANE, supra note 1, at 6, 26; HUNT, supranote 1, at 50; Crane, supra
note 128, at 14.
134.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 6; see Crane, supra note 128, at 14. An interesting analogy
can be drawn between the commercialization of fashion and literature and European notions of
authentic creativity and originality. In the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the growing
commercialization of the literary world led to the development of two conflicting categories of
literary production: the genius versus the industrialist or profiteer. MARILYN RANDALL,
PRAGMATIC PLAGIARISM: AUTHORSHIP, PROFIT, AND POWER 162-64 (2001). Traditionalists
considered true originality and creativity to flow from the "starving unappreciated genius" who
created small discrete works of great quality for appreciation by elites and who ignored mass
popularity and accompanying commercial success. Id. at 162-63. On the other hand, the
industrialist or profiteer was disdained as an imitator of the genius who sought only to produce
mass quantities of lower quality work that aimed only for popular appeal and great financial
success. Id. at 162-64. Similar to the fashion world, literary works that achieved mass popularity
and commercial success "became the mark of a lack of aesthetic distinction that made the work
accessible to the mediocre and badly educated masses." Id. at 163; see infra notes 141-142 and
accompanying text.
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increased production and distribution of patterns and sewing
machines allowed middle and lower classes to imitate the fashions of
135
upper class groups, leading to a greater democratization of fashion.
However, to retain the visual hierarchy between themselves and their
perceived inferiors, higher-status groups moved on to other styles once
a particular fashion became too popular, creating a cycle of fashion
imitation. 136 This trickle-down, or top-down, model relied upon a
1 37
highly centralized industry of fashion designers and manufacturers.
From the nineteenth century until the 1960s, Parisian designers
primarily dictated fashion trends for women, while London designers
set the trends for men.138
In the post-World War I period, as the retail clothing market
(or ready-to-wear market) exploded, the United States lacked a strong
fashion design industry. Thus, many American designers hurried to
the Parisian fashion shows and copied the works of Parisian and
English designers. 139 American copyists first manufactured copies of
European designs in small, expensive amounts, and then at cheaper
prices in mass quantities. 140 In the 1930s and 1940s, a split grew
between clothing manufacturers in the United States over issues of
"design piracy," especially as to dresses and millinery.' 4 ' Some U.S.

CRANE, supra note 1, at 70, 72-73. Fashion historians tend to assert that fashion
135.
started to become "democratized in the nineteenth century" through copying of European and
East Coast city fashions. Id. at 72-73. Others have contended that this democratization of fashion
occurred more recently with creative designs becoming more readily available at various price
points. Design Piracy ProhibitionAct: Hearing on H.R. 5055 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (July 27, 2006),
available at http://www.stopfashionpiracy.comlindex.php/about the-bill (statement of Susan
Scafidi, Assoc. Prof. of Law and Adjunct Prof. of History, SMU, Visiting Prof. Fordham Law
School) (testifying in favor of DPPA protection) [hereinafter Scafidi Testimony].
CRANE, supra note 1, at 6; HUNT, supranote 1, at 106; Crane, supra note 128, at 17.
136.
137.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 134; Crane, supra note 128, at 17.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 27-28; Crane, supra note 128, at 17.
138.
139.
Crane, supra note 128, at 17.
140.
Id.; see Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1696-97. Famous fashion legend,
Coco Chanel, disdained the notion of trying to legally protect fashion designs, saying that
"[flashion should slip out of your hands. The very idea of protecting seasonal arts is childish."
Wolfe Testimony, supra note 16, at 5. See generally Wm. Filene's Sons Co. v. Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am., 90 F.2d 556, 557-58 (1st Cir. 1937) (reviewing growth of women's
ready to wear dress fashions based on copying of or inspiration from Parisian designs in
antitrust action between retailer and guild).
141.
Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461(1941) (antitrust action
regarding copying within women's garment industry); Millinery Creators' Guild. v. FTC, 109
F.2d 175, 176-77 (2d Cir. 1940) (antitrust action concerning copying of hat designs); Filene's, 90
F.2d at 557-58 (antitrust action concerning copying of dress designs). In Filene's, the court
distinguished between "design piracy" as copying the specific details of a dress and "style piracy"
as copying general characteristics of a dress design. Id. at 557-58; see Satava v. Lowry, 323 F. 3d
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manufacturers considered themselves to be "original creators" who did
not copy Paris designs, but only received inspiration from Paris
fashion shows to create small quantities of their own original
designs. 142 Other manufacturers, called "copyists," imitated exactly or
substantially the designs of other manufacturers for mass
143
production.
Various designer guilds were developed that permitted
members to register their designs, after which the guild would sell the
designs only to retailers who bought exclusively registered designs
from manufacturers.144 The penalty for manufacturers who failed to
comply with the guild rules was denial of their designers' products, so
non-participating manufacturers lost out on a potentially valuable
opportunity to mass produce guild members' creations. 145 In addition,
members of the design guilds could be fined if they continued to
provide products to merchants who purchased copies of unregistered
designs. 146 In this way, both manufacturers and retailers were under
pressure to produce and buy only registered guild designs,
respectively, leading to claims of antitrust. 147
In antitrust actions brought by retailers, lower courts decried
the immorality of design piracy, but they were divided on whether

805, 812 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining that sculptor of glass in glass jellyfish possessed only "thin
copyright" to limited distinctive aspects of his works and not overall style of glass-in-glass
medium).
142.
Fashion Originators,312 U.S. at 461; Millinery, 109 F.2d at 176; Filene's, 90 F.2d at
557-58; see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
143.
Fashion Originators,312 U.S. at 461; Millinery, 109 F.2d at 176; Filene's, 90 F.2d at
557-58. With a style life of only about three months, the Fashion Originators Guild became
concerned about the increasing ability of copyists to quickly and often surreptitiously obtain
designs for rapid copying. Filene's, 90 F.2d at 558. The Filene's court stated
[a] manufacturer who is a copyist does not send stylists or designers to Paris for
inspiration. Instead he copies original designs of other manufacturers, which is
accomplished in different ways. Sometimes a copyist buys dresses from retailers who
have purchased them from original creators. Sometimes employees of copyists visit
the showrooms of original creators and memorize or take notes of the details of the
original design there displayed. Sometimes copyists obtain sketches or photographs of
successful designs of original creators from agencies which make a business of
supplying such sketches and photographs. Sometimes copyists bribe employees of
original creators to furnish samples of their employers' original designs or to let them
see samples from which they make sketches, and occasionally the original designs are
stolen from the original creators.
Id.
144.
Fashion Originators,312 U.S. at 461-63; Millinery, 109 F.2d at 176; Filene's, 91 F.2d
at 558-59.
145.
See supra note 144.
146.
See supra note 144.
147.
See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
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antitrust laws were violated. 148 In Millinery Creators' Guild, Inc. v.
FTC, the government brought an antitrust action against a hat guild
that sought to press retailers into boycotting manufacturers that
produced knock-offs of fine hats and in turn boycotting any retailers
who continued to purchase from design pirates. 149
The court
recognized that fashion designers were not just concerned about
preventing the unethical business practice of piracy, but also
possessed more self-serving motives such as protecting their markets
and prices from lower-priced imitations. 150 Ultimately, despite the
arguably unethical nature of copying, the Supreme Court determined
that designs were not legally protected under patent or copyright, and
guild efforts to protect designs were coordinated actions that
weakened competition and narrowed channels of distribution in
contravention of antitrust laws.15 1 As a result of the Millinery
decision, the cycle of copying from Parisian designers within the U.S.
52
garment industry continued unabated until the 1960s.1
In the 1960s, the dominant top-down model-in which the elite
members of society influenced the way the rest of society dressedbegan to face competition from the new bottom-up model, in which
fashions diffused from the lower classes up to higher-status groups.

148.
Millinery, 109 F.2d at 177-78 (determining that the hat guild which had controlling
position in industry had violated antitrust laws as to price-fixing and creating anticompetitive
monopoly for legally unprotected designs); Filene's, 91 F.2d at 561-62 (applying rule of reason,
court finds nothing illegal or unreasonable in guild's effort to protect against design piracy since
retailers had other adequate markets from which to purchase dresses).
149.
Millinery, 109 F.2d at 176.
150.
Id. at 177-78. The court stated that
[iut is true that concerted activity may be proper to eliminate evils, even though those
evils are not violations of positive law, and the fact that the pirate is immune from
legal restraint is not of itself sufficient cause to forbid the Guild from devising other
means to control him. But here the courts have refrained from enjoining the pirate
because they will not support a monopoly in an unpatentable idea. It would be strange
to say that the Guild may establish this same monopoly by extrajudicial methods.
Style piracy has been lethal in its effect on hat prices, and one of its results has been
to make the latest fashions readily available to the lowest purchasing classes. The
market of the high-grade originators has been sharply curtailed, and their prices have
suffered correspondingly. It is safe to say that the members of the Guild instituted
their antipiracy campaign to protect their markets and price levels, as well as to
improve business morals within the industry.
Id.
151.
Fashion Originators,312 U.S. at 463-68. See Millinery, 109 F. 2d at 177-78.
152.
CRANE, supranote 1, at 27-28; Crane, supra note 128, at 14-15. In the literary world,
Professor Randall indicates that copying becomes plagiarism when one mechanically copies from
another with a "presumption of covertness" trying to confuse the public about the authentic
author of the work. RANDALL, supra note 134, at 30-31. The element of covertness is generally
not found in fashion copying where the public is typically aware that knock-offs are not produced
by the original designer. Id.
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In the bottom-up model, youth and urban subcultures developed their
own fashion trends that emphasized self-expression and declined to
follow the fashion dictates of higher-status groups. 153 Beginning in
the 1960s and 1970s, the desire to express one's own personal identity
through clothing led to tremendous fashion diversity. 154 Designers
now competed with each other to meet the individualized tastes of a
consumer-driven marketplace. 155 Fashion designers no longer focused
on "imposing a style on the public," but now had "to perceive and to
anticipate hidden demand" in their customer base. 156 Numerous
American designers were quick to capitalize on this shift toward
individual fashion identities and created fashion lines oriented toward
15 7
the lifestyle of a particular market segment or consumer group.
As consumer-driven fashion began to displace class fashion in
the 1960s, the fashion industry became much more fragmented and
fashion centers proliferated across the globe.15 8 While many luxury
fashions still emanated from Paris, 159 designers worldwide began to
seek out the next major fashion trend by roving the streets, college
160
campuses, and urban music clubs for their next creative inspiration.
Some design firms even hired "cool hunters" to seek out the next big
trends from urban subcultures in an effort to capture styles that the

153.
BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 18-19; CRANE, supra note 1, at 14-15, 192;
HUNT, supra note 1, at 55; Crane, supra note 128, at 14-15. Professor Crane notes that age has
supplanted social status with new fashions emerging "from lower socioeconomic
groups.. .adolescents and young adults who belong to subcultures, or style tribes." Id. at 15. In
addition, urban youth are open to mixing their own styles with established luxury fashions,
jettisoning luxury items once they are no longer considered to be cool. CRANE, supra note 1, at
15, 191-92; Crane, supra note 128, at 14.
154.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 134-35.
155.
Id. Professor Crane notes that "class fashion" gave way to "consumer fashion." Id. at
134. She adds that "[c]onsumers are no longer perceived as 'cultural dopes' or 'fashion victims'
who imitate fashion leaders but as people selecting styles on the basis of their perceptions of
their own identities and lifestyles. Fashion is presented as a choice rather than a mandate." Id.
at 15.
156.
Id. at 21.
157.
BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 12; CRANE, supra note 1, at 10-11, 148-49.
Professor Crane indicates that Ralph Lauren and Espirit initiated the now heavily-imitated idea
of designing and distributing fashion lifestyles that went beyond clothing to a vast array of other
designer products. Crane, supra note 1, at 21.
158.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 15, 134-35; Crane, supra note 128, at 18.
159.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 134-35, 146.
160.
BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 18-19; CRANE, supra note 1, at 135, 183-85,
192; Crane, supra note 1, at 18-19, 21-22. Some fashion forecasters employ "cool hunters," staff
who are trained to "observe and interview adolescents in suburbs and poor urban neighborhoods"
in an effort to predict up-and-coming fashion trends. CRANE, supra note 1, at 192; Crane, supra
note 128, at 22.
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public would broadly embrace. 161 Athletes, musicians, and Hollywood
celebrities, rather than members of traditional class-based high
society, became the muses for designer fashions. 162 In this changed
climate, U.S. designers became more competitive with their European
counterparts 63 and eventually developed into the $350 billion dollar
industry that it is today.164
Despite this modern fragmentation, clothing has retained the
power to identify class. 165 With respect to prestigious designers like
Lilly Pulitzer, "[t]he very fact that you knew about [them] meant you
were part of an exclusive circle. You were a debutante. You attended
an Ivy League school. You had a trust fund. You were a member of a
restricted social club. You wintered in Palm Beach and summered on
Nantucket."' 66 Despite greater democratization of fashion, high-end
fashion designers still harbor fears that the brand exclusivity will be
diminished if the style is "worn by people who pull the brand down...
167
The snob appeal gets quickly diluted."'
In today's world, practices have come full circle: a number of
successful American designers have found other global competitors
copying their designs, 168 just as American designers previously copied
161.
BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 18-20. For example, hip-hop artists turned such
mundane items as track suits, oversized jeans, and underwear now exposed outside one's pants
into major fashion trends. Id. at 18-19.
162.
Id. at 18-19; CRANE, supra note 1, at 15, 135; Crane, supra note 128, at 16. Hip-hop
artists have been particularly successful in establishing fashion trends and outselling traditional
haute couture designers. BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 18-19. For example, "Sean John
sells way more than a Donatella Versace." Id. at 119.
163.
CRANE, supra note 1, at 146-49.
164.
Day, supra note 13, at 241; Are Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique
Industries: Hearing on Design Law Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intell.
Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Narciso Rodriguez,
Fashion Designer, Council of Fashion Designers of America (CFDA)), available at
http://judiciary.house.govfhearings/pdf/Rodriguez0O0214.pdf
(testifying in favor of DPPA
protection) [hereinafter Rodriguez Testimony]; The Design Piracy Prohibition Act: Hearing on
H.R. 5055 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Jeffrey Banks, Fashion Designer, CFDA),
available at http://arts-of-fashion.org/stopdesignpiracy.html (testifying in favor of DPPA
protection) [hereinafter Banks Testimony];
165.
Valerie Alter, Couture in the Courts: Intellectual Property Protection for Fashion
Designs, 14 TEX. ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 4, 8 (2005).
166.
Id. (quoting Suzanne C. Ryan, Back on the Rack Preppy is in Again, and Lily
Pulitzer's Bright Fun Clothes Are Riding the Wave of retro Fashion to New Popularity, THE
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2001, at D1).
167.
Id. (quoting Erin White, Protecting the Real Plaid from a Sea of Fakes, WALL ST. J.,
May 7, 2003, at B1); see also infra notes 192-209 and accompanying text.
168.
Are Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries: Hearing on Design Law
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement of Congressman William Delahunt), available at
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their Parisian counterparts. 169
The traditional copying and
distribution process has greatly accelerated through the technological
growth of textile production systems 170 and the global reach of the
Internet. 17 1 The U.S. fashion industry has suffered an estimated $12
billion in revenue losses from counterfeit goods, and billions more in
lost tax revenues. 172 Ultimately, these losses led segments of the
fashion industry to lobby Congress for copyright protections under the
73
proposed DPPA in an effort to abate copying.

II. ECHOES OF THE SUMPTUARY IMPULSE

IN THE

DPPA

A. Overview of ProposedDPPA
Introduced in Congress in 2006, 2007, and most recently
2009,174 the DPPA seeks to extend copyright protection to clothing
design.175 Currently, fashion designs receive only limited intellectual
178 and trademark1 79
property protection 176 under copyright, 177 patent,
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Delahunt080214.pdf (House bill co-sponsor testifying in
favor of DPPA protection) [hereinafter Delahunt Testimony]; see also supra note 121 and
accompanying text.
169.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164; Raustalia & Sprigman, supranote 15, at 1696-97;
see also supra note 139 and accompanying text.
170.
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
171.
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135; see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
172.
Day, supra note 13, at 241.
173.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see generally Stop Fashion Piracy,
http://www.stopfashionpiracy.com (fashion industry website provides quotes from designers and
congressional testimony in support of 2006 and 2007 proposed Acts) (last visited Oct. 15, 2009).
174.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see generally Stop Fashion Piracy, supra
note 173.
175.
See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see generally Stop Fashion Piracy, supra
note 173.
176.
See Orit Fischman Afori, ReconceptualizingProperty in Designs, 25 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L. J. 1105, 1158-62 (2008) (calling for sui generis statute scheme to safeguard industrial
design based upon copyright laws but with shorter time periods for protection). Professor Afori
notes that "industrial design is situated at the cross roads of art, technology, and an entire
industry dedicated to attracting the consumer's attention. Thus legally speaking, design suffers
from a hybrid nature since it has much in common with the three major intellectual property
paradigms,-copyright, patent and trademark laws-yet it does not exactly fit any one of them."
Id. at 1107-08; see also infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text. See generally CHRISTINE COX
& JENNIFER JENKINS, NORMAN LEAR CENTER, BETWEEN THE SEAMS, A FERTILE COMMONS: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FASHION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 7-16 (2005)
(discussing various forms of current intellectual property protection for fashion designs).
177.
See, e.g., Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1004-05 (2d Cir. 1995)
(finding deliberate infringement of leaf and squirrel design on copyright holder's sweaters); Folio
Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining that
arrangement of Folio Roses on fabric pattern was protected under copyright); Poe v. Missing
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and trade dress.18 0
Copyright law does not offer its expansive
protections to clothing because it is typically categorized as a useful
Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that vinyl, rock-filled swimsuit as soft
sculpture were protected under copyright); Eve of Milady v. Impressions Bridal, Inc., 957 F.
Supp. 484, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (ruling that lace designs on wedding dresses were
copyrightable as writings and that defendants were liable for copyright infringement); Scarves
by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchs. and Mfrs., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (finding that
designs printed upon scarves were subject to copyright); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda
Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y 1959) (finding willful copyright infringement in
copying of design printed on fabric as writing); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, 112 F.
Supp. 187, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (finding that fashion design drawing was copyrightable art,
but not the manufacture of dress in drawing); see also Cox & JENKINS supra note 176, at 7-10;
Day, supra note 13, at 245-46; Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1699-1700; Hedrick,
supra note 14, at 228-31. But cf. Russell v. Trimfit, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(determining that the idea for designs of "toe socks" was not copyrightable); SCOA Indus., Inc. v.
Famolare, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding that wavy lines on shoe soles were not
copyrightable). However, in recent years, fashion has been recognized for its artistic purposes
and has often become the subject of art exhibitions at well-respected museums. Marshall, supra
note 12, at 323-24.
178.
35 U.S.C. §101 (2008) (defining design patents); see also COX & JENKINS, supra note
176, at 21-22; Day, supra note 13, at 250-51; Ashley Hofmeister, Louis Vuitton v. Dooney &
Bourke, Inc.: Resisting Expansion of Trademark Protection in the Fashion Industry, 3 J. Bus. &
TECH. L. 187, 192-93 (2008); Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1704-05; Hedrick, supra
note 14, at 222-24; cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. Olga Co., 510 F.2d 336, 339-40 (2d Cir. 1975)
(determining that Olga's patents for women's panty briefs were invalid as nonobvious).
179.
15 U.S.C. §§1125, 1127 (2008) (defining trademark and trademark infringement and
dilution); see, e.g., Coach Leatherware Co., Inc. v. Ann Taylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 170 (2d Cir.
1991) (finding a trademark infringement in confusingly similar hang tags on knock-off
handbags); see also Cox & JENKINS, supra note 176, at 22-23; Day, supra note 13, at 248-49;
Hofmeister, supra note 178, at 194-98; Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1700-02;
Hedrick, supra note 14, at 224-27. But cf. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, 340 F.
Supp. 2d 415, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting trademark infringement and dilution claims in
repeated linking of distinct company monograms "DB" not "LV' on handbags). Outside of the
fashion industry, some courts have also enjoined the production and sale of clothing that bears
the ornamental logos of sports teams and leagues under an exclusive right to market one's
trademark while others have refused to extend trademark protection to monopolize these
trademark symbols. Veronica J. Cherniak, Ornamental Use of Trademarks: The Judicial
Development and Economic Implications of an Exclusive Merchandising Right, 69 TUL. L. REV.
1311, 1314 (1995); see, e.g., Boston Profl Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., 510 F.2d
1004, 1012 (5th Cir. 1975) (enjoining unauthorized, intentional duplication of a professional
hockey team's symbol on embroidered emblem); Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Wichita
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp 651, 664-65 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (enjoining production of NFL
team jersey replicas or jerseys with dominant colors of professional teams, but not barrng
production of non-professional team replicas); Nat'l Football League Props., Inc. v. Consumer
Enters., 26 II. App. 3d 814, 819-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (issuing preliminary injunction
restraining defendant from manufacturing or selling NFL patches with emblems of NFL clubs
without authorization because of likelihood of source confusion). Ms. Cherniak argues that the
ornamental use of trademarks should be protected just as "originality and fancifulness" are
protected under copyright. Cherniak, supra, at 1346.
180.
See COX & JENKINS supra note 176, at 14-16; Day, supra note 13, at 249-51;
Hofmeister, supra note 178, at 193-94; Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1702-03;
Hedrick, supra note 14, at 227; cf. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205
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article81 ' and not a creative work. 8 2 Copyright protection is only
afforded to designs if they are "original"'1 3 and expressive aspects of
the design are separable from the utilitarian functions of the
clothing. 184
Non-utilitarian lace and embroidery and whimsical
(2000) (suggesting that knock-offs of children's clothing were not protected under trade dress);
Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1009 (finding that aesthetics of designs were not intended as source
identifiers and therefore were not afforded trade dress protection); Coach, 933 F.2d at 171
(finding that configurations of ornamental features of handbags were not covered under trade
dress protection).
181.
17 U.S.C. §101 (2008) ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An
article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article."'); see also Day,
supra note 13, at 191-92; Hofmeister, supra note 178, at 191-92; Raustalia & Sprigman, supra
note 15, at 1699-1700; Hedrick, supra note 14, at 228.
182.
17 U.S.C. §102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device."). Works of authorship include the following
categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5)
pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7)
sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. Id.; see also Malla Pollack, Towards a Feminist
Theory of the Public Domain, or Rejecting the Gendered Scope of United States Copyrightableand
Patentable Subject Matter, 12 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 603, 607-08 (2006) (contending
that lack of copyright protection for making clothes is "gendered and anti-feminine" based upon
notions of "traditional women's work"); supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
183.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a)(1), (b)(1). The code states that "[a] design is 'original' if it is the
result of the designer's creative endeavor that provides a distinguishable variation over prior
work pertaining to similar articles which is more than merely trivial and has not been copied
from another source." Id. at (b)(1). Fashion designs are not protected if they are (1) not original;
(2) staple or commonplace, such as a standard geometric figure, a familiar symbol, an emblem, or
a motif, or another shape, pattern, or configuration which has become standard, common,
prevalent, or ordinary; (3) different from a design excluded under (2) only in insignificant details
or in elements which are variants commonly used in the relevant trades; (4) dictated solely by a
utilitarian function of the article that embodies it; or (5) embodied in a useful article that was
made public by the designer or owner in the United States or a foreign country more than 2
years before the date of the application for registration under this chapter. Id. §1302; see also
Day, supra note 13, at 246-47; Hofmeister, supra note 179, at 192.
184.
17 U.S.C. § 101. The copyright code defines pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
as including
two-dimensional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models,
and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such works include works of
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian
aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the
utilitarian aspects of the article.
Id; see, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F. 2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1980)
(reversing grant of summary judgment, stating that artistic elements of belt buckle, separated
from its utility, were protectable under copyright); Brighton Collectibles, Inc. v. Coldwater
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decorations on accessories would therefore be protected as expressive
aspects of design.185
Under the DPPA, however, all fashion designs would receive
three years of copyright protection, recognizing the fast pace of fashion
1 86
trends while still allowing for a robust "public domain" of clothing.
To receive protection, designers would be required to apply for
registration within six months of the date the design was first publicly
displayed.' 8 7 Infringement would occur when a design or an image of
a design is actually copied and the copyist knows or has reason to
know that the fashion design is claimed for protection. 88 Secondary
liability for wholesalers and retailers who purchase and distribute
pirated designs and its attendant remedies are also retained from the
Copyright Act under the proposed DPPA. 189 Damages of $5 per copy,
but not exceeding $250,000 total, could be awarded for
infringement. 90
Although on its face the DPPA is based on fashion design
protection and intellectual property rights, the social and economic
objectives underlying earlier sumptuary laws on dress are strong
undercurrents of the proposed law. As with other sumptuary laws,
the DPPA was introduced in a time period of great transition and flux
Creek, Inc., No. 06-CV-1848 H(POR), 2008 WL 2120500, at *34 (S.D. Cal. May 28, 2008)
(denying summary judgment where plaintiff had met burden of showing potential copyright
infringement of decorative "Carolina heart" on handbags); Magical Mile, Inc. v. Benowitz, 510 F.
Supp. 2d 1085, 1088 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that
plaintiff has adequately plead copyright infringement claim of allegedly copied hand-painted
embellishments on women's apparel); Express v. Fetish Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1211, 122425 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (determining that non-utilitarian lace and embroidery, but not camisole
itself, was protected under copyright); Nat'l Theme Prods. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp.
1348, 1353-54 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (finding that artistic three-dimensional costumes with minimal
functional components were protected under copyright as applied art); Animal Fair, Inc. v.
Amfesco Indus., 620 F. Supp. 175, 186-88 (D. Minn. 1985) (holding that sculptural features of
bear claw slippers are separable from utilitarian aspects and, therefore, copyrightable); cf.
Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2005) (determining that design
for casino uniforms was not separable from its utilitarian purposes and therefore was not
protected under copyright). See also Day, supra note 13, at 246-47; Hofmeister, supra note 178,
at 191-92; Hedrick, supra note 14, at 228-29.
See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
185.
186.
H.R. 2196 §2 (d)(a)(2). See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see generally
Marshall, supra note 12, at 309-10; Williams, supra note 12, at 311-14 (articles provide overview
of proposed DPPA).
H.R. 2196 §2 (b)(3)(B). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
187.
H.R. 2196 §2 (e)(1)-(3). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
188.
H.R. 2196 §2 (h). See supra note 12 and accompanying text; see also supra note 92
189.
and accompanying text (analogizing Elizabethan fines against tailors and hosiers as early form
of secondary liability).
H.R. 2196 §2 (g). See supra notes 12, 92 and accompanying text.
190.
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in U.S. society. 191 The Act echoes the sumptuary impulses of earlier
ages as they relate to the familiar themes of sustaining the visual
hierarchy and the privileged dress of higher-status groups, protecting
the national economy in a time of increasing global competition, and
promoting discourse on public morality as to appropriate dress.
B. New Efforts to Police Social Boundaries
Past efforts to protect fashion designs were unsuccessful, partly
because the protection of elite designers seemed antithetical to the
democratization of fashion. 192 It did not help that they smacked of the
sumptuary laws of the past that sought to police social boundaries
through dress and to privilege access to fashion to higher-status
groups only.' 93 In 1914, when the top-down model of diffusion still
dominated the fashion industry, the National Design Registration
League, a fashion industry association, lobbied for the enactment of
design protection laws, arguing that
[pirates] take that popular design of high-priced goods and reproduce it in cheap
material and put it on the market, the result being that the ladies going into their
laundries see the clothing of their colored cooks and wash girls trimmed with the same
pattern of lace they use on their expensive garments .... [S]he will not wear the same
19 4
style of lace and embroidery that is used by the servants in her household.

The elitist language of the League's testimony and the notion of
offering legal protections for expensive designer clothing raised
discomfort among legislators.' 95
In questioning the League's
representative, House Representative Oscar Callaway of Texas
expressed his unwillingness to provide legal protection to fashion
designs which would have the effect of helping the wealthy
differentiate themselves from the general public through fashion.196
In objecting to design protection, he sarcastically remarked that
[t]he trouble with this bill is that it is for the benefit of two parties; that is, the
enormously rich who want to display their splendid apparel that they can wear in this
country that the ordinary riff-raff ought not to be allowed to wear, and those rich
concerns who have these extra and selected designers to design these special patterns
for those elite. I think, too, the public ought to be cut out. I think those rich elite ought
to be segregated in this country and have the immensely rich off in one place and the

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

See infra notes 222-54 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19, 135 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
Briggs, supra note 9, at 204-05.
Id.; see also COX & JENKINS, supra note 176, at 18 & n. 6.
Briggs, supra note 9, at 204-05; see also Cox & JENKINS, supra note 176, at 18 & n. 6.
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to come and eat with them. Is not that the
ordinary riffraff ought not to be allowed
19 7
whole sum and substance of [this bill]?

This same "trouble" plagues the DPPA. By protecting elite
designs outside the reach of most consumers, the proposed Act
conflicts with the democratization of fashion through cheaper knockoffs. 198 Courts have come to similar conclusions. In the KieselsteinCord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., the dissent argued against the
majority's approval of copyright protection for the sculptural elements
of a designer belt buckle, 199 stating that such protection is inconsistent
20 0
with the language and policies underlying existing copyright law.
In his dissent, Judge Weinstein recognized the tension between
exclusivity and popularization of fashion, stating that
[i]mportant policies are obviously at stake. Should we encourage the artist and increase
the compensation to the creative? Or should we allow cheap reproductions which will
permit our less affluent to afford beautiful artifacts? Appellant sold the original for
$600.00 and up. Defendant's version went for one-fiftieth of that sum. Thus far
of commerce and the masses
Congress and the Supreme Court have answered in2favor
01
rather than the artists, designers and the well-to-do.

197.
Briggs, supra note 9, at 204-05; see also COX & JENKINS, supra note 176, at 18 & n. 6.
See BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 36 (noting that the modern fashion
198.
industry "is about negotiating this tension between the popular and the exclusive" and that
fashion designers ultimately "pursue a paradox: to create designs that connote social exclusivity.
• . and then reinterpret them for their customers. The very act of selling tends to vitiate the
exclusivity being sold."). Courts have also tried to negotiate this tension in trademark
infringement and dilution cases concerning well-known exclusive designs. For example, in Rolex
Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 495 (S.D. Fla. 1986), the court determined that
part of the harm to Rolex in defendants' sales of counterfeit Rolex watches to Rolex investigators
was the loss of prestige ownership of an exclusive brand for high-end consumers. Aside from
fakes hurting the company's reputation for quality Rolex timepieces, the court also indicated that
[o]thers who see the watches bearing the Rolex trademarks on so many wrists might
find themselves discouraged from acquiring a genuine because the items have become
too common place and no longer possess the prestige once associated with them. The
fact that such bogus watches can be obtained at cheap prices only aggravates the
problem.
Id.; see also Ferrari v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235,1243-45 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing and quoting Rolex to
support the protection of trademark, in part, based upon exclusive nature of trademarked
product in infringement case over defendant's sale of replicas of plaintiffs sports cars);
Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d
464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) (determining that parties who sought to purchase prestige from
displaying defendant's imitations of luxury design Atmos clock resulted in actual consumer
confusion in visitors to homes actionable under trademark).
Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1980);
199.
see also supranotes 182-84 and accompanying text.
Kieselstein-Cord,632 F.2d at 995-98 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
200.
Id. at 999 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
201.
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In the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., a trade
dress case, 202 William Coston, Wal-Mart's attorney, tapped into this
same concern about protecting higher-status designers and their
customers in his opening oral argument to the Supreme Court. 203
With respect to the copying and sale of inexpensive knock-offs of
pricier children's clothing designs, he stated that
[tihis case raises the legal question of when a product design is inherently distinctive
under the Lanham Act, but it also raises the more practical question of how high will we
raise a trademark barrier to competition. The affluent consumer, the middle class
consumer, and the low[-]income consumer all want to wear clothes that are popular and
stylish. Here, the $25 seersucker dress sold under the Samara label was also sold with
a noticeably different quality by Wal-Mart for $3.88 under different labels, Cuties by
Judy and Small Steps. The effect of the [lower] court's injunction here is to deny
consumers the opportunity to buy any seersucker dress with appliques which may or
2 04
may not be found in the collar.

Similarly, in a 2008 congressional hearing on the DPPA, Steve
Maiman, co-owner of a mid-size fashion manufacturing firm and an
opponent of the act, testified that the law would deprive middle- and
working-class families of affordable, up-to-date fashions. 205
He
asserted that the DPPA would create two distinct classes-those wellheeled customers with the financial resources to purchase expensive
copyrighted designs, and the rest of the public that cannot hope to
afford such protected designs. 0 6 Maiman, who did not expressly
approve or disapprove of knock-offs, 20 7 noted that luxury designers do
not reduce their prices to compete with copyists 20 and that the highend design industry is not found trawling the aisles of Target or Sears
20 9
for high fashion inspiration.
202.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
203.
Respondent's Opening Oral Argument, Wal-Mart v. Samara, 529 U.S. 205 (2000),
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999_99_150/argument/.
204.
Id. After the unanimous victory for his client, Mr. Coston stated that the court's
decision "sends a message that the focus of the law should be on the consumer welfare, not the
welfare of trademark owners. It ensures that lower- and middle-class shoppers can purchase
contemporary fashions at reasonable prices." David G. Savage, 'Knock-Offs' Don't Violate
Trademarks, JusticesRule, L. A. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2000, at A-1.
205.
Maiman Testimony, supra note 16, at 31-33.
206.
Id. at 31-32.
207.
Id. It is well-recognized that there is a booming industry in the U.S. in producing
knock-offs of high fashion items as well as selling magazines through informing consumers about
how to find these cut-rate styles. BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 23-25.
208.
Maiman Testimony, supra note 16, at 31-32; see also Wolfe Testimony, supra note
16, at 3-4.
209.
See Maiman Testimony, supra note 16, at 30-31. Mr. Maiman stated that luxury
designers make up less than five percent of the annual American volume spent on clothing.
"Everybody else does get-most of the styles do trickle down. They don't trickle up. The higherend designers are not going to go to Target stores, Macy's, Dillard's, Kohl's and Sears and

2009]

SUMPTUARY IMPULSE AND DPPA

Sensitive to this perception of elitism, proponents of the law
have made a point of arguing that the DPPA would actually protect
many small design firms and relatively new fashion designers, not just
established luxury designers. 210 Supporters have pointed out that
some well-known fashion designers, such as Isaac Mizrahi (formerly
for Target), Mark Eisen (for Wal-Mart), and Nicole Miller (for J.C.
Penney), offer lower-priced versions of their designs to mass-market
2 11
retailers to help bring high-end fashions to the average consumer.
However, DPPA proponents testifying before Congress have often
fallen into the same trap as the National Design Registration League
did in 1914 by championing the protection of exclusive designs for
high-end customers as opposed to popularized imitations for the
212
general public.
To make their case, proponents testifying on behalf of the bill
have often cited the mass copying of haute couture designs found on
the Hollywood red carpet or other high-end fashions created for elite
clients to make popular and less expensive imitations. 213 In the 2006
debate on the DPPA, the congressional committee heard testimony
about copies of a Marc Bouwer coral dress worn by Desperate
Housewives actress Marcia Cross to the 2007 Golden Globes 214 and a
black Zac Posen gown worn by Felicity Huffman at the 2006 Academy
Awards, both of which appeared in retail stores nationwide within a
few days of the respective awards programs. 2 15 In 2008, designer
Narciso Rodriguez testified about his concerns over knock-offs of
signature shoes that he created for Sarah Jessica Parker that were
worn on Sex and the City.2 16 He also recounted the wedding dress he
created specifically for his friend, Carolyn Bessette, for her marriage
Penney's to get their inspiration. It all works from the top down." Id. Mr. Maiman also argued
that the proposed DPPA was more likely to protect high-end established designers who, unlike
relative unknowns or small firms, have the necessary legal and financial resources to register
and defend their designs in court. Id. See also Sprigman Testimony, supra note 16, at 3-4; Wolfe
Testimony, supra note 16, at 3-4 (both Sprigman and Wolfe warn of expensive litigation delays
harming fashion industry).
210.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164 (asserting that young designers and thousands of
small fashion firms are harmed due to legality of copying); Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135
(recounting home-based handbag designer, Jennifer Baum Lagdameo, who lost major wholesale
order due to availability of cheaper knock-offs); see also Day, supranote 13, at 242-43.
211.
BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 23-24; Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at
23, 26; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
212.
See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
213.
See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text.
214.
Banks Testimony, supranote 164; see also Scruggs, supranote 13, at *135.
215.
Banks Testimony, supranote 164.
216.
Rodriguez Testimony, supranote 164, at 26.
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to John F. Kennedy, Jr.2 17 Rodriguez claimed that approximately
seven to eight million knock-offs flooded the market that year, which
he asserted prevented him from recouping his investment by limiting
sales to only about forty dresses. 218 Rodriguez said that the low sales
of the dress were the result of his discriminating clientele being
unwilling to purchase a dress that "was already too widely
distributed" 219 to the masses, which invokes Representative
Callaway's 1914 concerns about using the law to protect the "snob
appeal" of upper-class fashion designs.
Ultimately, the Act's proponents have trouble defending
against the concerns of protecting luxury designers at the expense of
ordinary people since the law would likely provide substantial benefits
to luxury designers who could limit access to designs to their high-end
customers. This policing of both consumption and assumption 220
echoes the privileged access to fine dress found in earlier sumptuary
laws, 22 ' helping to reinforce social boundaries through a visual
hierarchy of dress. Therefore, it is unlikely that legislators will find
much constituent support for the protection of fashion designers
without an appeal to broader societal concerns.
C. Addressing Societal Anxieties in UncertainEconomic Times
Professor Hunt has noted that throughout history "[w]hat
remains unchanged is the capacity for controversies over the
regulation of consumption to be the bearer, often symbolically, of
contemporary social anxieties." 222 Like earlier sumptuary laws, the
most recent call for passage of the DPPA has occurred in a period of
great political, social, and economic flux, when the United States is
under pressure to maintain its perceived global economic and political
power and status. 223 Therefore, concerns about the fashion industry
are indicative of broader national anxieties about rapid technological
217.
Id. at 25.
218.
Id.. Many who purchase knock-offs would probably not be able to afford a Narciso
Rodriguez original. See Maiman Testimony, supra note 16, at 54 (testified that copies of high-end
dresses serve "a different market segment than the people who can afford to pay for the original
design"). Yet the popularity of knock-offs may actually help to enhance the value and prestige
associated with owning an actual original. See BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 25 (arguing
that knock-offs actually help to affirm and enhance elite status and superiority of originals).
219.
Day, supra note 13, at 242.
220.
See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
221.
See supra notes 44-46, 72-79, 89-109, 116-120, 128-33 and accompanying text.
222.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 391.
223.
See infra notes 227-53 and accompanying text.
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developments in a digital age, 224 protection of the U.S. economy from
the strain of economic globalization, 225 and national security fears
with respect to global terrorism. 226 Proponents of the DPPA have
rolled together these uncertainties with the intellectual property
desires of fashion designers in an effort to create more broad-based
support for the passage of the DPPA.
Currently, rapid technological progress and the global reach of
the Internet are causing major changes in social, political, and
economic relationships worldwide. 227 Recently, the movie and music
industries lobbied Congress for greater legal protections when peer-topeer file sharing over the Internet endangered their revenues. 228 The
fashion industry lagged behind these industries and did not originally
seek any copyright protection from piracy. 229
Yet, fast-paced
technological advancements in production and distribution, coupled
with growing electronic dissemination of fashion information in online
news, blogs, and discussion boards, imperils traditional fashion design
and production cycles. 230 Such advancements have ultimately led
many in the industry to realize the need for and demand stronger
23
copyright protection. '
Technological change has alarmed many members of the
fashion industry and their congressional supporters. 232 Much of the
testimony in favor of the DPPA recognizes that copying has always
been a substantial component of the fashion industry. 233 Yet, the way
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See infra notes 228-39 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 240-49 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 250-53 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 228-53 and accompanying text.
See generally Lucille M. Ponte, The Warez Scene: Digital Piracy in the Online World,

in CRIMES OF THE INTERNET, CH. 19, 384-407 (Schmalleger & M. Pittaro eds. 2008) (questioning

increasing emphasis on criminal liability for peer-to-peer file sharing of music and movies).
However, fashion experts argue that there are significant differences "between the viral diffusion
of content and the viral diffusion of fashion. Apparel is a physical product, and requires fabric
and manufacturing for production, and still further expense to distribute. Digital content can be
distributed for virtually nothing over the Internet." BOLLIER & RACINE, supra note 16, at 31; see
also Sprigman Testimony, supra note 16, at 1-2 (arguing that fashion industry does not need
copyright protections of music and movie industries in order to flourish).
229.
Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1715-16.
230.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164; Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20;
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
231.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164; Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20;
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
232.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164; Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20;
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
233.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135; see also
Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1695-97.
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copying occurs has changed substantially. In the past few decades,
the copying and distribution phase took three or four months,
permitting high-end designers to recoup some of their investments
234
before copyists flooded the market with cheaper knock-offs.
However, technological advancements have rapidly accelerated the
copying and distribution phase, shrinking the process to just a few
days or weeks. 235 Digital photography now permits high-quality, 360degree photographs of creations seen on the catwalk to be sent
instantly to copyists over the Internet. 236 New software programs can
quickly develop exact patterns from these photos that allow
automated machines to perfectly cut and stitch the copied designs in a
few days. 237 Similarly, the Internet provides easy access to detailed
descriptions of innovative designs. 238
Designers claim that such
copying deprives them of the sales they need to support future
innovation.2 3 9 And this technology will only continue to evolve. The
DPPA is an effort to stabilize established fashion cycles and stem the
tide of copies in an era of rapid technological change.
Interlaced with technological concerns are anxieties about
globalization and its negative impact on the U.S. fashion industry, as
well as more general concerns about the health of the U.S. economy in
a changing global economy. Past sumptuary laws were often aimed at
protecting the national economy during times of economic distress,
and the DPPA is no different. 240 In the past, when U.S. designers
234.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164; Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at 27;
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
235.
Banks Testimony, supra note 164; Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at 27;
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135; Scruggs, supranote 13, at *135.
236.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20; Banks Testimony, supra note 164;
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135; Scruggs, supra note 13, at *135.
237.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20; Banks Testimony, supra note 164;
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
238.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20; Banks Testimony, supra note 164;
Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at 26; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
239.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20; Banks Testimony, supra note 164;
Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at 26; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
240.
See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. In his testimony, Representative
Delahunt indicated that the enactment of the 2008 economic stimulus package under President
Bush showed that the national economy was "in trouble" and that Congress needed to act to
preserve and promote U.S. global competitiveness through the protection of fashion designers.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 21. Professor Hunt recognized that earlier sumptuary
laws on dress had been transformed from a regulation of items to regulatory schemes that
promote economic protectionism. He wrote that
[o]n the visible surface there was a shift away from the distinctive selection of the
objects of regulation, the clothes, jewellery [sic], ornaments that epitomized
sumptuary laws. The altered form is that of protectionist economic regulation which
attaches itself to increasingly generalized regulatory objects; the targeting of French
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copied from their French counterparts, there was little concern about
providing copyright protection to American fashion design, since
fashion was not yet a major part of the US economy. Now, however,
concerns about the loss of hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs and $12
billion in annual revenues to China, India, and other emerging
241
manufacturing countries appear throughout the legal commentary
and congressional testimony in support of the DPPA. 242 In particular,
China has been harshly criticized in congressional testimony about
the DPPA.243 Infringement of U.S. copyrights in China has been
perceived as a threat to the U.S. economy before, as evidenced by the
complaints that the U.S. filed with the World Trade Organization
(WTO) for intellectual property violations in the music and movie
In addition, the U.S. deficit and the nation's
industries. 244
wine, Italian leather, Indian cottons increasingly became only instances of the wider
category 'import' and less and less viewed as moralized objects of regulation. Yet this
is a process which is never complete. In the late twentieth century under the insistent
prod of recession hostility to Japanese products in the United States shares many
discursive features with seventeenth century Anglo-French polemics.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 361; see also supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
Day, supra note 13, at 238; Scruggs, supra note 13, at *135; Hedrick, supra note 14,
241.
at 243-44.
Delahunt Testimony, supranote 169, at 19-21; Banks Testimony, supra note 164, at
242.
6-11; Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at 27; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135, at 11-14.
One may question whether U.S. jobs or revenues were truly being lost to China since U.S.
retailers are some of the biggest importers of Chinese textiles for resale at low price levels to
U.S. consumers. Randall Frost, China: Dressed for Success, Jan. 2, 2007, available at
http://www.brandchannel.com/featureseffect.asp?pfid=349. It was estimated that more than
50% of apparel not subject to import quotas sold in the U.S. came from China in 2006, with
expectations of continued growth into 2008. Id.
Rep. Delahunt's testimony criticized China, stating in one portion of his testimony
243.
that
FBI, Justice and Commerce Departments report that China is growing an industry
based on copying and exporting American fashion designs . . . . I read in the Wall
Street Journal that in China, one city is devoted to making socks, another - kids
clothes, etc. We need to make sure we don't wake-up [sic] to find a Garment Knock-Off
City! They can create infrastructure in minutes.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20.
In April 2007, the U.S. filed complaints against China with the World Trade
244.
Organization (WTO) for failing to stop widespread piracy of copyrighted goods, including the
production and sales of counterfeit CDs and DVDs. Request for Consultations by the United
States, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS362/1 (Apr. 10, 2007), available at www.worldtradelaw.net/cr/ds362-1(cr).pdf; see
also Mark Drajem & Li Yanping, U.S. Plans WTO Case Against China on Movies, Books,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.boomberg.netlapps/news?pid=20602081&sid=
adazsvpNlITI&refer=benchmarkcurrency-rates; U.S. Plans WTO Charge on China Piracy
Goods, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 2007, http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2007/04/07/
us-plans wtoscharge-on-china-piracy-goods; Washington Files WTO Piracy Cases Against
China, REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2007; U.S. Files WTO Piracy Case Against China, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 10, 2007, availableat http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/
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indebtedness to China exacerbate concerns about the declining
economic power of the United States in the global economy. 245 Even
though the United States often calls for free market competition,
passage of the DPPA would signal a clear desire to resort to economic
protectionism to shield the U.S. fashion industry and, in turn, the
economy in general during a period of intense global competition,
particularly from China.
The proposed DPPA is also seen as necessary to help the
United States compete economically with other nations that offer
246
copyright protection to their textile and fashion design industries.
Legal experts and congressional witnesses contend that copyright
protection of fashion design is needed to keep the United States in
step with Europe, India, and Japan, all of whom offer copyright
protection for their designers. 247 In particular, the European Directive
dealing with fashion design 248 is viewed as the model that the United
States should emulate because it provides for the registration of
fashion designs putting others on notice of the designs protected
249
status.

idUSL1031680320070410. The WTO recently handed down its decision indicating that Chinese
law "is inconsistent with Chinese obligations" to adequately protect trademark and copyright
under its obligations under the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement. Appellate Body
Report, China - Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009), at 134, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dispu-e/362r conce.pdf. However, Chinese criminal infringement laws were not found to be
deficient based on the threshold levels for bringing criminal infringement cases. Id.; see also
WTO. Finds China Copyright Law Lacking, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at Bll, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27fbusiness/27trade.html.
245.
China currently holds about $1 trillion in U.S. debt and may have less interest in
U.S. Treasury notes in light of its own slumping economy and falling tax revenues. Keith
Bradsher, U.S. Debt Is Losing Its Appeal in China, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/01/07fbusiness/yuan.php.
246.
See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text.
247.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20; Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at
27; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135; see also Marshall, supra note 12, at 328-30.
248.
Council Directive 98/71/EC, 1998 OJ (L 289) 28-35.
249.
See infra note 264 and accompanying text. However, critics of the DPPA have often
responded that there is an overall lack of use of the European design registration process.
Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1737, 1740-42, 1744; Hedrick, supra note 14, at 253-56;
Schmitt, supra note 12, at SF1. Of all EU design registrations, fashion design registrations only
amounted to 8.9% of all design registrations, despite housing many of the most creative fashion
capitals in the world. Hedrick, supra note 14, at 252-53. Furthermore, a copyright litigation
explosion is more likely to result in the U.S. because of differences in litigation culture between
the U.S. and EU civil law nations. Id. at 253-56. In 2006, out of 6,430 design registrations for
clothing, shoes, and accessories, none of the seven cases heard by the EU design courts involved
fashion designs. Id. at 253-54.
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Lastly, proponents of the DPPA have tried to link the sale of
fashion knock-offs with support for terrorist groups, tapping into
national security fears. 25 0
Congressman William Delahunt has
supported the idea that that the sale of counterfeit goods such as
handbags-already illegal under trademark law-funnels resources to
organized crime groups and terrorist organizations, such as
Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and
paramilitary groups in Ireland. 25 1 Others have strongly disputed the
link between counterfeit goods and organized crime and terrorist
groups, and have questioned the use of these claims to justify
increased intellectual property protection. 252
Nonetheless, some
proponents of the DPPA have used this alleged link to draw upon
wide-ranging national fears about global terrorism in attempt to
253
generate broader support for the DPPA.
D. PublicMorality and the Language of Theft
Just as early sumptuary laws moralized about excess, idleness,
and immodesty, issues of public morality also underlie the efforts to
enact the DPPA, emphasizing that buying copied fashions is in
addition to being criminal, an immoral act. 254 In his testimony,
Representative Delahunt chastised average consumers who buy
knock-off purses or wallets for thinking that their conduct is a
victimless crime when, in fact, there are two victims: the designer and
the U.S. economy. 255 He equates their purchases with support for the
deadly acts of terrorist groups. 256

250.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 21; see also Dana Thomas, The Fight
Against Fakes, HARPER'S BAZAAR, Jan. 2009, availableat http://www.harpersbazaar.com/
magazine/feature-articles/the-fight-against-fakes-0109-3
(stating that counterfeit goods are
linked to child labor, human trafficking and terrorism).
251.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 21 (quoting Dana Thomas, Op-Ed, Terror's
Purse Strings, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=9DO4E2DB113CF933A0575BC0A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=al).
It is important to distinguish between counterfeit goods and fashion knock-offs in this discussion.
Counterfeit items violate trademark rights and are often sold on the street by criminal elements,
while fashion knock-offs are legally distributed in legitimate retail stores.
252.
GLOBAL

HEDI NASHERI, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., THE INT'L CENTER, DEPT. OF JUST., ADDRESSING
SCOPE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 9 (Nov. 2004), available at

htpp://www.ncjrs.gov/pdfilesl/nij/grants/208384.pdf
(warning
counterfeit goods in financially supporting terrorist activities).
253.
See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
254.
See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
255.
Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 21.

256.

Id. at 20.
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overstating
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In addition, references to theft appear throughout testimony
supporting the passage of the DPPA, 257 a similar tactic to the
prevalent use of the shoplifting analogy to discourage movie and music
peer-to-peer file sharing. 258 The theft analogy is arguably justified
when discussing the illicit copying of music and movies, which violates
existing copyright law. 259 On the other hand, most copying of fashion

designs is currently legal under copyright statutes. 260 Despite its
legality, supporters of the DPPA refer to those individuals or
businesses that copy fashion designs as "pirates," and characterize the
pirates' conduct using words such as, "theft," "steal," and "cheat."261
For example, Representative Bob Goodlatte of Virginia, a DPPA
supporter, liberally sprinkles theft language into his testimony,
stating that
if a thief steals a creator's design, reproduces and sells that article of clothing, and
attaches a fake label to the garment to market it, he would be violating federal law.
However under current law it is perfectly legal for that same thief to steal that same
design, reproduce and sell the article of clothing if he does not attach a fake label to it.
This loophole allows pirates to cash in on others' efforts and prevents designers in our
country from reaping a fair return on their creative investments ....
[U]nder
current
262
law this theft is legal unless the thief also reproduces a label or trademark.

It is important to note that this sort of theft language was not
used in the U.S. when U.S. firms were regularly copying the details of
Parisian fashion designs 263 and the United States was viewed as a
257.
See infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
258.
In passing the No Electronic Theft Act in 1997, removing the profit motive from
criminal copyright infringement, Congressional testimony analogized online file-sharing to
shoplifting items from a bricks-and-mortar store. 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2009); Copyright piracy and
H.R. 2265, The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and
Intel.Prop.of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 7-8 (1997) (statement of Rep. Bob
Goodlatte, Subcommittee Member), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju48724.000/hju48724_0f.htm.
259.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(c).
260.
See Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20; Banks Testimony, supra note 164, at
7, 9; Rodriguez Testimony, supra note 164, at 26; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
261.
See e.g., Delahunt Testimony, supra note 169, at 20; Hearing on Design Law - Are
Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 8 (2008) (statement of
Professor William T. Fryer III, Univ. of Baltimore School of Law); Hearing on Design Law - Are
Special Provisions Needed to Protect Unique Industries Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intell. Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 51-52 (2008) (statement
of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Member, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property)
[hereinafter Goodlatte Testimony]; Banks Testimony, supra note 164, at 8-10;Rodriguez
Testimony, supra note 164, at 25-28; Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135.
262.
Goodlatte Testimony, supra note 261, at 51-52.
263.
Raustalia & Sprigman, supra note 15, at 1696-97; see also Scafidi Testimony, supra
note 135, at 14.
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pirate nation for all kinds of creative works. 2 64 In her congressional
testimony, Professor Susan Scafidi, a law professor and supporter of
the DPPA, recognized the nation's pirate past as part of a normal cycle
for emerging economies, which start out copying creative works of
more developed nations. 265 This in turn provides the foundation for
the accumulation of financial resources and domestic expertise in each
specific creative industry. 266 Once the funding and creative skills have
been established, the pirate nation's own creative sector ultimately
demands intellectual property protection for its own domestic creative
works. 26 7 For example, the United States initially was a major
importer of intellectual property and a notorious safe harbor for piracy
of a wide range of creative works, 268 steadfastly rejecting opportunities
to participate in international copyright conventions, 2 9 such as the
Berne Convention. 270 Over the past hundred years, the United States
has developed the capital and expertise needed to maintain its own
successful creative industries and has become a primary exporter of
intellectual property. 271 Eventually, in 1988, the United States signed
on to the Berne Convention 272 and became a major player in crafting
27 3
international conventions safeguarding intellectual property.

264.
Scafidi Testimony, supra note 135, at 15; RANDALL, supra note 134, at 196; see also
Monica E. Antezana, Note, The European Union Internet Copyright Directive as Even More than
It Envisions: Toward a Supra-EU Harmonizationof Copyright Policy and Theory, 26 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 415, 423, 434 (2003) (contending that the U.S. was a haven for literary piracy,
particularly best-selling British books); Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Right Act of
1990: American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 397, 400-01 (1995) (indicating
that the U.S. as pirate nation isolated itself from intellectual property jurisprudence for nearly
two centuries). Professor Randall indicates that in the nineteenth century "cross-border copying"
of literary works "shifted from the category of dishonest theft to one of legitimate appropriation"
using "the ennobling euphemism of conquest." RANDALL, supra note 134, at 196.
265.
Scafidi Testimony, supranote 135, at 13.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.; see also RANDALL, supra note 134, at 196.
268.
RANDALL, supra note 134, at 196; see also supra note 275 and accompanying text.
269.
Antezana, supra note 264, at 420; Brandi L. Holland, Note, Moral Rights Protection
in the United States and the Effect of the Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 on
U.S. InternationalObligations,39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217, 228, 230 (2006).
270.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
102 Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Brussels June 26, 1948).
271.
Antezana, supra note 264, at 426, 434; Sherman, supra note 264, at 398-99.
272.
Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).

273.
Sherman, supra note 264, at 400-01; Patrick G. Zabatta, Moral Rights and Musical
Works: Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1106 (1992). By joining the
Berne Convention, the United States garnered substantial legal protection of its intellectual
property exports and became "a Berne 'insider.' In this new position, the United States would be
better able to play a role in shaping the future of international copyright protection law while
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Despite the nation's nearly one hundred-year cycle from pirate
nation to international protector of intellectual property, the United
States has shown little patience for replication of this cycle in
emerging economies in China, India, and other developing countries.
In heavily criticizing other pirate nations for their lack of ethics, the
United States' moralizing fails to recognize its own pirate past and
that the claimed "theft" of fashion designs and other creative works
may simply be part of a normal cycle of economic and creative
development, not a sign of international immorality.

III. KEY LESSONS FROM PAST SUMPTUARY PROJECTS
Issues of social control, economic protectionism, and public
morality can be teased out of the stated goals and the congressional
testimony in support of the DPPA. After analyzing earlier sumptuary
laws, it is not surprising that this sumptuary project has been
undertaken during a time of economic, political, and technological
flux, as individuals and nations seek to maintain the status quo in the
face of a confluence of pressures.2 7 4 While it is important to recognize
the echoes of earlier sumptuary laws in the proposed DPPA, it may be
even more essential to learn the lessons of earlier sumptuary
regulation to inform the policies of the DPPA, should it pass. In the
past, sumptuary codes were ineffective because of sporadic
enforcement, 275 the failure of stated governmental objectives, 276 and
changing societal views of morality.27 7 Considering the similar
assumptions underlying earlier sumptuary laws and the proposed
DPPA, these same challenges may also doom the effectiveness of the
suggested law.
One of the main problems with sumptuary laws on dress was
the lack of consistent enforcement. 2 78 Enforcement tended to occur in
occasional bursts arising from the passage of some new law or the
enthusiastic enforcement of certain local officials. 279
Ineffective
enforcement of these laws typically stemmed from the failure of
government policy-makers to secure substantial public support for the
protecting its rapidly growing copyright-based industries." Sherman, supra note 264, at 400-01
(footnotes omitted).
274.
See supra Part II.C-D.
275.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 342-47; see supra notes 93, 111-13.
276.
See supra notes 94-99, 114-17 and accompanying text.
277.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
278.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 342-47; see supra notes 93, 111-13.
279.
HUNT, supra note 1, at 342-47; see supranotes 93, 111-13.
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sumptuary codes.280 While, on its face, the DPPA seeks to provide
additional legal protection for fashion designs, it could also result in a
more subtle legal reinforcement of a visual hierarchy between highend consumers and everyone else. In the past, sumptuary laws tended
to be most effective in societies in which there was an acceptance of
the natural social hierarchy. 28 1 For example, in ancient Roman and
Greek societies, there was a shared belief in the prescribed
hierarchical social order that enabled sumptuary laws on dress to
endure for centuries. 28 2 However, in the contemporary United States,
society is grounded in the notions of individual choice and social
fluidity. Thus, it is unlikely that members of the general public, many
of whom are avid consumers of fashion copies or imitations, 283 would
accept the notion of a natural social order that protects the fashion
28 4
designs of high-end designers and their upper-class clientele.
Also affecting the United States' ability to enforce the DPPA is
the fact that the United States fashion industry has moved away from
the traditional notion of fashion being disseminated in a top-down
manner. 28 5 Today, as in the 1960s and 1970s, many elite designers
are influenced by the fashion sense of urban subcultures and they
28 6
seek to reinterpret that style for their wealthier customers,
attempting to reflect the existing fashion tastes of a distinct consumer
segment in a bottom-up manner. 28 7 This market fragmentation no
longer assumes that lower-status groups will automatically imitate
the dress of higher-status ones. 28 8 In addition, the emergence of the
bottom-up model and other diffusion models makes it more difficult for
parties to clearly establish the originality of their registered
designs. 28 9 The numerous sources for new fashion designs would
certainly complicate the determination and enforcement of copyright
protections under the DPPA.

280.
See supra notes 94-99, 114-17 and accompanying text.
281.
HUNT, supranote 1, at 53-54.
282.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
283.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
284.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
285.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
286.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
287.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
288.
See discussion supra Part I.D.
289.
See discussion supra Part I.D. New York Times fashion reporter, Guy Trebay
indicated that even determining originality in an industry that has thrived on copying would boil
down "to a single truism: one is as original as the obscurity of one's source." BOLLIER & RACINE,
supranote 16, at 14.
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Furthermore, the "fundamental contradiction" effect of earlier
29 0 For
sumptuary codes is likely to persist if the DPPA is enacted.
example, the ban on silk hoods in colonial Massachusetts only led to29a1
surge in demand for these items of clothing among the public.
Efforts to ban imported woolen products in England only led to
292 Similarly,
increased efforts to smuggle in wool from other countries.
in seeking to limit the copying and dissemination of certain registered
fashion designs, the DPPA is likely to increase the demand for these
items. This demand, in turn, would promote more illicit copying of
these fashions to satisfy consumer demand for the protected designs.
Instead of achieving its stated goals, the DPPA, like the ban on silk
hoods or imported wool, is more likely achieve the opposite results.
Finally, while some societies may have been able to sustain
sumptuary codes due to shared societal religious beliefs and senses of
morality, such reliance on shared morality is unlikely to succeed
today. For example, Confucian and early Puritan societies had some
success enforcing sumptuary dress codes as an extension of their
spiritual duties of economic thrift, social conformity, and modesty in
dress. 293 In contrast, Representative Delahunt's efforts to reconnect
sumptuary law, represented by the DPPA, with notions of public
294
morality are unlikely to resonate with the American public.
Surveys have shown that few Americans consider file sharing of
movies and music to be theft or stealing. 295 Therefore, it is even less
See supra notes 94-99, 114-17 and accompanying text.
290.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
291.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
292.
See discussion supra Part I.A.
293.
See discussion supra Part II.D.
294.
Surveys consistently show that most Americans, especially teenagers, think illegal
295.
file-sharing is acceptable, and not stealing, so long as there is no profit motive involved John B.
Clark, Copyright law and the DigitalMillenium Copyright Act: Do the penalties fit the crime? 32
N. E. J. ON CRIM.& CIV. CONFINEMENT 373, 391 (2006). In an October 2003 Harris poll, some 78
percent of people who downloaded music reported that they did not think it was theft, while
Internet users in general agreed by a margin of 53 percent. Justin D. Fitzdam, Private
Enforcement of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Effective without Government Intervention,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 1085, 1115 (2005). In an earlier 2003 Pew Research Project, their survey
found that about two-thirds of those who shared files online indicated that "they don't care
whether the files are copyrighted or not." MARY MADDEN & AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET &
AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT: PEW INTERNET PROJECT DATA MEMO 1 (2003), available at
http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2003fMusic-Downloading-Filesharingand-Copyright.aspx.
This lack of concern about copyright law was particularly strong amongst young Americans, ages
18 to 29, with 72 percent claiming not to care if the files they downloaded were copyrighted. Id.
at 5-6. Four out of five full-time students expressed no concern about the copyright status of the
files they downloaded. Id. at 6. Furthermore, adults aged 30 to 49 were in general agreement
with these two groups, since 61 percent of these adults also had a lack of concern about
downloading copyrighted work. Id. at 5-6.
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likely that the public will be willing to give up their desires for knockoff fashions, even though they still pay for them in the marketplace
instead of taking them for free. Furthermore, unlike music and
movies, which are arguably affordable for everyone, high-end fashion
is out of the reach of most consumers' budgets. As a result, the
general public is unlikely to rally around the morality of copyright
protection of fashion designs if it means higher prices and decreased
choices in fashion. In turn, Congress will be unwilling to limit
consumer choice and access to fashionable items, especially in difficult
economic times. In addition, few consumers are likely to believe or be
swayed by the notion that, if they stop buying knock-offs of clothing
and accessories, the funding for terrorism will dry up and the threat of
global terrorist attacks will be greatly reduced. Overall, efforts to
moralize about the protection of fashion designs will probably be
unsuccessful in promoting the passage or the enforcement of the
DPPA.
IV. CONCLUSION

Sumptuary laws have lingered in different forms throughout
history, and the proposed DPPA echoes the main themes underlying
these codes. The challenges of weak enforcement, increased piracy,
and differing public notions of morality create formidable obstacles to
the successful enactment and implementation of the DPPA. To
achieve the stated goals, proponents of the DPPA will first need to
reach an agreement within the fashion industry that the law will truly
benefit the economic and creative needs of the entire industry, as well
as the U.S. economy as a whole, and not just the needs of high-end
More importantly,
fashion designers and their elite customers.
however, the advocates for the DPPA must garner public endorsement
of the Act from individuals outside of the fashion industry. This
support could be achieved by showing that, if the DPPA is enacted,
jobs will be saved or possibly increased in the fashion industry,
especially in challenging economic times. Proponents could also
attempt to convince the public that clothing prices will not climb
higher and fashion options will not be dramatically reduced as a result
of the new law. Without clearly defined and measurable objectives
that would benefit the public at large, the law will likely suffer the
same the fate as earlier sumptuary laws on dress. We should
seriously consider whether the claimed benefits of the DPPA are
outweighed by a continuation of the more negative aspects of earlier
sumptuary codes-privileging social elites, bolstering economic
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protectionism, and encouraging insular moralizing-that are perhaps
best left behind as relics of our sumptuary past.

